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Abstract
Although much attention and scholarship have been devoted to the 1992-1995 Bosnian
War, very little work has been done on one of the key figures of that conflict, Alija Izetbegović.
No biography exists of Izetbegović in English, nor is there even a serious journal article which
thoughtfully analyzes Izetbegović’s statesmanship during the war. There is a great need then for
a work which intelligently analyzes Izetbegović’s actions during that turbulent time, something I
have attempted to do in this thesis. I argue that Alija Izetbegović was a flawed political leader,
who because of reasons of temperament and religious belief was unable to successfully confront
the many challenges that were presented to him. Yet I also argue that Izetbegović must be judged
in light of the remarkably difficult situation he was in, when his choices were often limited and
when he faced circumstances which were often beyond his control.
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Introduction
An Elusive Figure
Of all the major actors of the Bosnian conflict, Alija Izetbegović was perhaps the one
who was – and remains today - the most enigmatic and confusing. We basically know who
individuals like Franjo Tuñman, Radovan Karadžić, or Slobodan Milošević were – unscrupulous
nationalists whose unpleasant mugs appeared on countless television screens and newspaper front
pages, visual incarnations of those Balkan demons who were responsible for the particular hell
that Bosnia was during the early 1990s. Izetbegović however, in spite of his being one of the key
players in the Bosnian drama because of his role as president of Bosnia, is to most people a
totally unknown figure, a mystery.1 Show a photograph of Milošević to someone, with his sharp
crew cut and squat, rather ugly face, or of Karadžić with that wild, crazy mane of hair, and it is
likely that instant recognition will occur, but show one of Izetbegović with his sad-faced visage
and that quintessential beret on his head, and all you are likely to get is a blank expression. Yet
even for those who know of him, it is quite possible that their opinions will be unformed or
tentative, if for no other reason than because so much is not known about him.2
Not that there are not quite a few people who do believe we have a proper understanding
of Izetbegović, and they have not hesitated over the years in making their views known. One
such category of individuals is Izetbegović’s defenders, those who see him as having been a great
Bosnian democrat who valiantly defended his people. Unsurprisingly, many Bosnian Muslims
fall into this category, those who consider their fellow Muslim Izetbegović the “father of the

1

As the Bosnian Serb columnist Gojko Berić notes, some see Izetbegović as a “Bosnian Ghandi,” others as
“an Islamic fundamentalist;” some say that he is “a living legend,” others “a mild form of dictator.” He
also writes, “…it seems to me that it is easier to catch an eel with your bare hands at the mouth of the
Neretva…than to deal with the political and intellectual profile of Alija Izetbegović.” Gojko Berić, Letters
to the Celestial Serbs, trans. Saba Risaluddin (London: Saqi Books, 2002), 258, 266.
2
Consider that although there are at least nine biographies on Milošević, not one exists on Izetbegović in
English, and perhaps not even in Bosnian. Jasna Dragovic-Soso, “Why Did Yugoslavia Disintegrate?” in
State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration, ed. Leonard J.
Cohen and Jasna Dragovic-Soso (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008), note 79, 35 and Gale
Stokes, “From Nation to Minority: Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia at the Outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars,”
Problems of Post-Communism 52, no. 6 (November/December 2005): note 13, 18.
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nation” i.e. an independent Bosnia - an entity which before 1995 had never even existed.3 Such
Muslims, a few of whom this historian has met here in St. Louis, tend to be quite sensitive about
his legacy, as though it has been sullied enough by others over the years and they wish for it not
to be sullied further.4 There are also a few Westerners who are admirers of his, perhaps the most
prominent of whom is the French philosophe Bernard-Henry Levy, who as recently as at a 2006
conference declared that Izetbegović was “a friend” who “embodied… the definition of a
warrior… a man who made war because he was obliged to, but without liking it, finding it at the
same time disgusting and necessary.”5
On the other extreme there are Izetbegović’s critics, who make a number of claims
against the man which run from the sensible to the rather extreme. Unlike fanatics who seek to
do things like rehabilitate figures like Slobodan Milošević or deny the crimes of individuals like
General Ratko Mladić, they are composed of a vocal minority of scholars as well as much of the
Serbian (although also to an extent the Bosnian and Croatian) peoples who seek not so much as to
totally ignore the responsibility of Serbs (and to a lesser extent the Croats) for all the bad things
which happened during the Bosnian conflict as to put more of the onus on Izetbegović for what
happened – a pox on all of their houses sort of approach which seeks to revise the oft-accepted
narrative of the Bosnians simply being victims of Serbian and Croatian aggression. This sort of
revisionism has taken different forms by different individuals – I will mention only three here,
scholars whose works have a good deal of substance and whose views are fairly representative of

3

There were various independent Bosnian kingdoms during the Middle Ages, but none of these states were
nations in the contemporary sense. And during the last five hundred years, Bosnia has always been simply
one component part of greater states or kingdoms, namely the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and
Yugoslavia.
4
“For most of the Bosniacs, Izetbegović is the father of the Bosniac nation. They refer to him in an
affectionate way as dedo/grandpa, and for many he remains above criticism.” Ante Cuvalo, Historical
Dictionary of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Lanham, Maryland, Toronto, and Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow
Press, Inc., Second Edition, 2007), 119.
5
“Salmagundi Conference: War, Evil, the End of History, and America Now,” Salmagundi, nos. 158-159
(Spring-Summer 2008), 143. Levy also at some point described Izetbegović as a Bosnian Charles de
Gaulle (i.e. the de Gaulle who led the French Resistance during World War II), something Berić says is
“panegyric nonsense from a philosopher who had simply ‘fallen in love with Bosnia’ and made friends
with Izetbegović.” Gojko Berić, Letters to the Celestial Serbs, 261.
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some of the common indictments made of Izetbegović and his statesmanship. There is Bat
Ye’or, a Jewish/Egyptian expert in the phenomenon of dhimmitude- the name for the inferior
status which non-Muslims have had under Islamic rule over the centuries up to the present day and who is much sought after in conservative and neoconservative political circles for her
crusading efforts against modern jihadism around the world. She sees Izetbegović as a
disingenuous Muslim who downplayed the history of ethnic hatreds within Bosnia and who
nonchalantly dismissed what she sees as the very legitimate fears that Bosnian Christians had of
some kind of reversion to Ottoman rule when he and his Muslim-majority SDA party came to
power in 1990, thus setting the stage for violence within the nation. Or there is the political
scientist Alan J. Kuperman at the University of Texas-Austin, who sees Izetbegović as an
indecisive and weak-willed ruler who was beholden to the hard line Islamic interests within his
political party, something that had terrible consequences - not the least of which in Kuperman’s
mind was Izetbegović’s dragging Bosnia into a brutal war which his nation was totally
unprepared for and which, even worse, was eminently avoidable. Third, there is the military
scholar John Schindler at the naval academy in Portsmouth, Rhode Island who, contra-Kuperman,
sees Izetbegović as a cunning Machiavellian who used in public his liberal, European persona as
a kind of ruse to distract from his more honestly-held fundamentalist vision, which was to create
a radical, Islamic state in Bosnia.
Finally, there is a third group which maintains a more moderate, in-between view of
Izetbegović, made up mostly of scholars and some independent thinking Bosnians who unlike the
first two groups tend to be more detached and objective in their evaluations of who Izetbegović
was, seeing him neither as harmless or as horribly malignant. Again, I will just mention three
individuals here. First there is the British scholar Sabrina Ramet, who uses the metaphor of a
“pepper-pot” to describe the beliefs of Izetbegović, with her portraying him as a political
opportunist who played the good secularist card to Europeans, Americans, and secular Bosnians
on one hand but could also appeal to the radical, fundamentalist yearnings of more religious
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Bosnian and foreign audiences when needed (although unlike somebody like Schindler she places
in her work almost all the responsibility for the bad that happened during the Bosnian war on the
Serbs’, and to a lesser extent the Croats’, shoulders).6 Or there is the view of the thoughtful
British historian of Bosnia, Marko Attila Hoare, who stresses the impact of the war and the lack
of help from the West as key factors in radicalizing Izetbegović and in making him take actions
that he might not have undertaken under more peaceful circumstances. Finally there is the French
scholar of Islam and jihad Giles Kepel, who sees Izetbegović as a kind of Islamic dinosaur who
tried to impose a limited version of an Islamic state on Bosnia but was largely unsuccessful,
simply because most Bosnian Muslims were too modern and such a vision as Izetbegović’s was
behind the times.7
Different opinions, different conclusions then about this elusive figure, a jumble of theses
and antitheses that never, to use a crude metaphor, seem to lead in my opinion to a really
complete Hegelian synthesis. Indeed, in my reading of the literature about Izetbegović, I was
impressed by how limited much of it seemed, how different works either failed to take into
account in an eclectic way the interpretations of all of the three groups just mentioned, or
appeared to neglect some important aspect of Izetbegović’s thought or actions. Many authors, I
felt, overlooked some negative aspects of Izetbegović’s Islamic Declaration, an important essay
he wrote in the late 1960s, while a few others over-emphasized these negative aspects; some
authors did not give due credence to the limited but legitimate concerns the Bosnian Christians
might have had about Izetbegović, while a few others blew up these fears out of proportion; a few
authors wrongly in my mind simply saw Izetbegović as being just as bad as Karadžić or
6

“To this day there is disagreement as to the nature of Izetbegović’s political program; this is, apparently,
no coincidence. His incongruous “pepper pot” included appeals to secular values as well as to Islamic
values ostensibly incompatible with those same secular values.” Sabrina Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias:
State-Building and State-Legitimation, 1918-2005 (Bloomington, IN and Washington D.C.: Indiana
University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 422-424.
7
For an example of Kepel’s argument (who uses the work of Xavier Bougarel’s Ph.D thesis “Islam et
politique en Bosnie-Herzegovine: Le parti de l’Action democratique”), see Giles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of
Political Islam, trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2002), 251-253, 406, note 5.

7

Milošević during the war, while others were not able to recognize that although Izetbegović did
not commit near the crimes that other Yugoslav figures did, he certainly committed his fair share;
and so on. In the main, then, I saw the basic problem in the literature as one of proportion, of not
getting the right equilibrium that carefully calibrated Izetbegović’s guilt and innocence in light of
the terribly difficult situation that he and others were facing. Or, to use an anecdote which is
again rather crude, there was once an old woman who was told about the lack of virtue of a
certain younger neighbor. The old woman responded, “It is not true, but it is true enough.” In
thinking about what many of the writers said about Izetbegović, I found myself reversing this
formulation and saying to myself, “It is true, but it is not true enough.”8
What I hope to do in the next pages then is address much of what critics, defenders, and
those in-between have said about Izetbegović and explain at times why I do not think what they
say is true enough, while at the same time trying to recognize their often valid points. Although
what follows is a history in the sense that it provides a brief narrative of a person’s past life and
some of his actions, it is a fairly limited history insofar as I focus only on those aspects of
Izetbegović’s career that are controversial or that have not received the understanding they
deserve. Still, there exists no other study that I know of (in English, anyway) which tries to
comprehensively evaluate Izetbegović’s statesmanship from when he first began his political
career soon after he left prison in 1988 to his resignation of the Bosnian presidency in 2000,9 so
in a sense at least I may be breaking new ground through this endeavor.

8

This anecdote comes from the historian John Lukacs, who also often feels compelled in his work to use
this reverse formulation. John Lukacs, The Last European War: September 1939-December 1941 (New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 240.
9
Well, there is Unholy War: Bosnia, Al-Qa’ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press,
2007) by John Schindler, a book on the development of Islamic fundamentalism in Bosnia that, while a not
a study of Izetbegović’s statesmanship per se, sees Izetbegović as an integral part of that phenomenon and
devotes a good deal of attention to the career and actions of Izetbegović. The problem with this work is
that while Schindler makes some original observations (e.g. concerning the Ottoman Empire, which he
quite rightly in my mind sees as a very negative entity as far as Bosnian Christians were concerned), his
portrayal of Izetbegović lacks perspective and is unduly negative. Izetbegović also features prominently in
Steven Burg’s and Paul Shoud’s The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International
Intervention (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999), an excellent work, but one in which the phenomenon
of Izetbegović is really not analyzed in an in-depth way. There is also a special issue of Islamic Studies –
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As can be seen from the title “A Leader Despite Himself?”10 I attempt to also explore one
of the most fascinating aspects of the Izetbegović phenomenon, which is how before he decided
to embark on his career as a politician in around 1989 at about the age of sixty-five he had
literally never exercised any other political office before. Unlike an individual like Slobodan
Milošević, who had spent many years climbing up the greasy pole of the Serbian Communist
beaucracy, all of Izetbegović’s political experience had been that of the political dissident - or
more precisely that of the religious dissident – working secretly with other devout Muslims like
himself in an effort to promote a more fervent Islam than the Yugoslav Communists were willing
to allow. Writing religious manifestos and trying to make connections with foreign countries in
order to spread his religious vision – that was his life in a nutshell for several decades, about as
far away as can be imagined from the typical political life. Izetbegović was jailed twice for these
religious activities, in 1946 for three years and in 1983 for just over five years, the second time
being after a celebrated Communist show-trial which received much attention throughout Bosnia
and made Izetbegović into a kind of martyr. When Izetbegović was released in 1988, he was able
to ride on that martyr-status and appeal to those Muslims throughout Bosnia who were looking
for a candidate who would represent them without apologies. Yet the difficulty Izetbegović faced
at that time was that there was little more to his candidacy besides his martyr-status; nothing in
this rather contemplative and shy man’s life had prepared him for the grueling demands of
statesmanship in the heart of the Balkans, especially when rabid nationalisms were increasingly

Volume 36, Numbers 2 and 3 (Summer/Autumn 1418/1997) - devoted to Islam in the Balkans, in which
different authors write about separate aspects of Izetbegović’s career and thought. Finally, there is a Ph.D
thesis by the French scholar Xavier Bougarel “Islam et politique en Bosnie-Herzegovine: Le parti de
l’Action democratique,” which as can be seen by the title is a study of the Party of Democratic Action, the
political party Izetbegović helped to found. Unfortunately I do not speak French and so have been unable
to take advantage of this study.
10
This is the title of an excellent previously unpublished essay by Berić about Izetbegović, which we will
come across throughout this thesis and analyze in more detail in the conclusion.
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coming to the fore. In spite of this huge handicap though, was the office able to make a leader, a
statesman, out of Izetbegović? Again, the next few pages attempt to provide an answer.11
One important note: I am just starting to learn Bosnian or Serbo-Croat, so there are many
sources which I was not able to consult which would have provided for me a fuller understanding
of Izetbegović and the actions he took. Inevitably then this makes my thesis at some level flawed
or at least (that word again!) limited, and honesty dictates me to state that there might very well
be arguments here that are at best incomplete or at worst simply wrong. Almost all my research
has been based on my perusal of the relevant secondary works as well as contemporary
newspaper and magazine articles which depicted important events connected to Izetbegović.
Finally, I should give special mention to one other method of inquiry I used for this work, that of
interviewing refugees from the former Yugoslavia who settled in St. Louis.12 During the early
1990s a trickle of mostly Bosnian Muslim refugees started to come into St. Louis, a trickle which
soon became a flood, with anywhere from 50,000 to 80,000 Bosnians now being residents in St.
Louis. Although I was not able to interview as many Bosnians as I would have liked (I
interviewed eleven subjects), thus making it impossible to provide any sort of sample group who
might be considered representative of the general Bosnian population, I was able to get some
interesting insights from those Bosnians I was able to talk to. A few of these insights I have
11

There is one more reason why this thesis could be of some importance. Especially after September 11th,
there has been increased attention devoted to the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism and the dangers it
poses. It will perhaps become increasingly tempting to see Izetbegović as simply another Islamic
fundamentalist who, while not at the level of a bin Laden, still represented a similarly malignant
phenomenon. Alongside this a kind of Serbian revisionism might occur which suggests that the Serbs were
perhaps not so wrong in trying to resist somebody like Izetbegović, even though they did it in a
disproportionate manner. It is important then to be able to see Izetbegović as he really was, and analyze
carefully his religious beliefs and statesmanship so as to be able to determine how much of a legitimate
threat he really was.
12
All of the subjects I interviewed signed a consent form (#071211C) approved by the Institution Review
Board of the University of Missouri St. Louis. This consent form had a description of the research I was
engaged in (basically, learning about the lives of former Yugoslav refugees in St. Louis and their opinions
of what happened in their homeland), how I would use the information gained from the interviews, and a
description of my subjects’ rights. One of the rights of my subjects was the right to be anonymous, an offer
that some – although not all – of my subjects decided to exercise. In the cases in which subjects are
anonymous, I simply refer to their ethnicity. In the case of the other subjects I give their names, something
that they had given me permission to do when they signed their consent forms, as well as more biographical
details about them since again they are willing to have their identity be known.
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included here, insights which I believe help to illuminate and supplement what already exists in
the more scholarly literature on Izetbegović.

Alija Izetbegović was born on 8 August 1925 in Bosanski Samać, near the
Bosnian/Croatian border in northern, northeast Bosnia. It was certainly an auspicious time in the
history of Bosnia. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later to be called Yugoslavia, or
‘Land of the South Slavs’) had been created just seven years before as a multi-national state
which comprised Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro,
and these various nations – as well as the different peoples within these nations - were just
learning to live together in a common state after having been under Austro-Hungarian or Serbian
rule (and more distantly for some of them, Ottoman rule) just a few years before. It was the
beginning of a stressful process that would never really cease to be stressful, with individuals of
one group of nations (or ethnicities) seemingly always being resentful about being – or believing
that they were - under the thumb of other groups. These grievances would always be pervasive
during the troubled history of Yugoslavia, lasting right up to Izetbegović’s assumption of the
presidency of Bosnia nearly 60 years later. At the particular time of Izetbegović’s birth and
childhood it was the Serbs who were ruling the roost and were seen by many as unfairly
dominating the other Yugoslavs from Belgrade, something that Izetbegović would still remember
many years later, the injustice of it all still prominent in his memory.13
After living for only two years in Bosanska Somać, Izetbegović moved with his family to
Sarajevo, where he studied at the best gymnasium in the city. As an adolescent he showed a
certain intellectual precocity, reading Bergson, Spengler, and Kant, an early indication of his
future proclivity for philosophical and abstract thought (something that would not always be to

13

Izetbegović recalls in his memoir how between the wars almost all of his teachers were Serbs, and how
the Yugoslav government was trying “to Serbianize the Muslims” in Bosnia. Alija Izetbegović,
Inescapable Questions: Autobiographical Notes, trans. Saba Rissaluddin and Jasmina Izetbegović
(Leicester, England: The Islamic Foundation, 2003), 15.
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his benefit). It was also around this time that he felt resurgence, after a certain period of neglect,
of his early childhood Muslim faith, something that would never leave him and would always be,
as faith is for any truly devout person, the cornerstone and foundation of his life.14
Izetbegović’s youth was interrupted by the Second European War, which after almost a
year and a half finally found its way to Yugoslavia. Although Prince Paul of Yugoslavia had
reluctantly submitted to his country becoming a part of the Axis pact on 25 March 1941, he was
overthrown by Serbian army officers in a British-supported coup who in turn installed the 17
year-old anti-Nazi King Peter II.15 Thousands of Yugoslavs famously marched down the streets
of Belgrade yelling “Bolje rat, nego pat!” or “Better war than pact!” Infuriated by Yugoslavia’s
intransigence, Adolf Hitler decided to give the Serbs exactly that. On 6 April 194116 Germany
brutally invaded Yugoslavia, conquered her (partly assisted in this process by Croatian and
Serbian soldiers, who often did not cooperate against the Germans), occupied mainly the Serbian
part of Yugoslavia and in most of the Croatian part allowed the Croat Ante Pavelić to set up his
fascist Ustaše government. What followed during the next four years in Yugoslavia was awful, a
cruel confirmation of the saying that the Balkans has more history than she truly deserves. In
addition to the cruelty inflicted by the Ustaše and to a lesser – but still very real – extent by the
Serbian-puppet government of Milan Nedić and the governments of other parts of occupied
14

At this time Izetbegović also joined the Young Muslims. He is fairly disingenuous in his description of
this organization in his autobiography, noting simply that they wanted to return Islam to the purity and
simplicity of the past. No mention is made, for instance, of the Young Muslims’ connections to the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt at the time, a pan-Islamic organization which sought to install sharia law throughout
the world and which was violently anti-Western. Nor does he mention the Young Muslims radical journal
he helped edit after the war, The Holy Warrior, which was what caused him to be sent to prison for the first
time. Alija Izetbegović, Inescapable Questions, 16-17 and John Schindler, Unholy Terror, 39. It is
important to mention here Izetbegović’s connection to the Muslim Brotherhood, for many of the ideas he
would eventually express in his Islamic Declaration and to an extent also in his Islam Between East and
West – the need for a pure society in which there will be no alcohol, prostitution, or gambling, the need for
authoritative leadership within an Islamic state, the stress on Islamic internationalism, the importance of a
strong anti-Zionism, and so forth - can clearly be linked to the basic ideas of the Brotherhood. For a
thoughtful summary of the history of the Islamic Brotherhood, see the recent work by Juan Cole, Engaging
the Muslim World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 51-57 as well as Kepel, Jihad, 27-30.
15
Sabrina Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 109-110.
16
Exactly fifty-one years later the members of the European Community (EC) were guilty, as history
professors are wont to say, of not reading their textbooks. They decided to choose 6 April 1992 as the date
to recognize an independent Bosnia, adding insult to injury as far as the Serbs were concerned.
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Yugoslavia, there were also not one, but several, wars occurring simultaneously on Yugoslav soil
at this time, involving mainly the Communist Partisans and the Serbian Četniks who fought both
the Fascists and each other (although at different times during the war the Fascists, Četniks, and
Partisans would also collaborate with one another, adding to the chaos and confusion).17
Although the numbers of casualties were later inflated to 1.7 million by Josip Tito’s
Communist regime in an effort to get more war reparations, the reality was terrible enough –
approximately 1 million were murdered or killed, of whom about 530,000 were Serbs, 192,000
Croats, 103,000 Muslims, as well as Jews (28,000 were killed or murdered in the Pavelić’s
Croatia), Roma, and other ethnic groups.18 Perhaps even worse, in some ways, than the quantity
of the murders was the quality – thousands of Serbs simply getting their throats slit at the largest
Croatian concentration camp Jasenovac, Yugoslavs burned alive inside their homes that had been
torched by soldiers (Yugoslav ethnic cleansing did not begin during the 1991-1995 wars of
Yugoslav succession), babies’ heads being smashed against walls; there was no end to the cruelty.
After the war Tito would ban any sort of discussion of the murders that went on between different
ethnic groups because of the ghosts which might be unleashed,19 but the memories would
certainly burn in the minds of Yugoslavs over the years of the second half of the twentieth
century, passed along to another generation through endless evening conversations and stories at
home.20

17

Sabrina Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 110-117, 133, 142-160.
Ibid., 114, 116-117, 119, 161.
19
Adam LeBor, Milošević: A Biography (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 10.
20
As one Serb from Bosnia (how this individual chose to be identified) put it to me, “Those peasants from
the villages, they had memories from the Second World War – they could not let go of the past.” A Serb
from Bosnia, interview by author, St. Louis, MO, 3 July 2008. Sead Begić, a 51 year old Bosnian Muslim
from Bosanska Gradijica, also saw the war as having had a formative impact on the consciences of
Bosnians. As he described the matter to me, his generation of Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were
constantly told stories of the atrocities which had occurred during World War II. “We [Serbs, Croats, and
Muslims] played together on the playground,” Begić said, “but later our parents at home would tell us:
‘You can’t forget about what happened during the war, be careful – Don’t marry a Christian girl!’
Although we weren’t told this sort of thing every night, we certainly were told it.” Sead Begić, interview
with author, St. Louis, MO, 10 December 2008.
18
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As he is about so many events and time periods in his life,21 Izetbegović is fairly sparse
when recounting what he actually did during wartime Bosnia (which was part of the Croatian
Ustaše state at the time), saying basically that he was a draft-dodger and leaving it at that. The
limited available evidence does suggest that he was fairly quiescent during this time, certainly
showing none of the same opposition against the Fascists that he would later demonstrate against
the Communists. Apparently his only protest against Ustaše rule occurred in 1943, when along
with a few other Muslims (including veiled women) Izetbegović showed up at the screening of a
film which they believed disrespected Islam and banged metal objects loudly during the showing
of the feature.22
The war in Yugoslavia ended with Tito’s communists on top, and very quickly Tito
inflicted revenge on Četniks and other enemies, murdering thousands in the process. Although
some promises had been made during the war about allowing for political pluralism, once in
power Tito used his power to ban other political parties and to clamp down on all potential
dissidents or opponents, especially those who were religious since they were seen as particularly
threatening (Tito’s disdain towards religion was manifested against Islam, for example, through
the banning of the veil, madrassas, and other Islamic customs and institutions. He also allowed
only one Islamic community to function, the Islamic Religious Community, which had to openly
pledge support to Tito in order to receive financial backing).23 Because of his involvement with
the Young Muslims, Izetbegović naturally fell into the religious category and was arrested in
1946 and sent to prison for three years, a relatively lenient sentence in comparison with some
other Young Muslims who received death sentences just a few years later. Fortunately
21

For instance, with the exception of mentioning the writing of his theological works and some other minor
details, there is simply a blank spot from 1966 (when he finished working for an agricultural firm) to 1983
(the year of his famous Sarajevo trial), with Izetbegović providing no information whatsoever about what
he was actually doing professionally or otherwise during these years in his memoir.
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Izetbegović was able to resume his life fairly easily after his release, going to law school and
graduating, marrying, and starting a family.24
During the 1960s and 1970s, in an effort to both promote his non-alignment movement
with Muslim countries and to provide a buffer-people between the Serbs and Croats, Tito
reversed his earlier persecution of Muslims and allowed for a more open atmosphere in
Yugoslavia for Islamic development. Mosques were built and a more open display of Muslim
piety was condoned.25 Perhaps influenced by this slightly more liberal milieu, Izetbegović came
out with his Islamic Declaration, a manifesto he wrote in 1969 and had published in 1970, and
which more than anything else in his career has been misunderstood by scholars and
commentators. This is rather strange, since the Declaration itself is fairly simple and
straightforward, yet for some reason many people have either read into it things it does not really
say, or have failed to note the things that it clearly does say.26 A document of about 80 double-

24

Alija Izetbegović, Inescapable Questions, 21-22, 25.
Ivo Banac, “Bosnian Muslims: From Religious Community to Socialist Nationhood and Postcommunist
Statehood, 1918-1992,” in The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their Historic Development from the
Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, edit. Mark Pinson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1993), 145. As the historian of Bosnia Noel Malcolm drolly puts it, “By the mid-1960s there were
prominent Bosnian Muslim diplomats serving in several Arab states and Indonesia, including the son of a
former Reis ul-ulema. That these officials were Communist Party members who had largely abandoned
their religion seemed not to matter, so long as they had names such as Mehmed, Ahmed, and Mustafa.”
Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 197.
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spaced pages calling for the establishment of a reformed, more humane, and internationalist
Islamic state, Izetbegović discusses the need for the Islamic world to unite and reject both the
extremes of modernity and fundamentalism and to embrace a religion which both respects the
ancient traditions of Islam and at the same time intelligently takes advantage of the modern
sciences and modern thought to improve the lot of all Islamic peoples. In many ways the
Declaration is an admirable and even liberal document, in which Izetbegović calls for all
Muslims – especially women - to be better educated (he contrasts the illiteracy of the Islamic
world today with the Muslims of 10th and 11th century Spain who were all able to read), exhorts
wealthy Islamic nations like Kuwait to be more supportive of their poorer Muslim brethren,
argues for the need to re-interpret many sharia laws in light of changed world circumstances,
urges the Islamic peoples to avoid the use of violence and force to achieve objectives, and so
forth. It is hard also not to be impressed by his religious devotion; sounding much like the
Protestant theologian Karl Barth, for instance, Izetbegović criticizes how Islam has become for so
many Muslims, both fundamentalists and secularists who have been too seduced by Western
influences, simply a rigid form of religious observance rather than a transformative experience
that enables one to be truly good and have love for others.27 Indeed, to be most charitable, one
could argue that Izetbegović is proposing here something similar to the approach to religion that
the late Catholic theologian Richard John Neuhaus espoused as far as Christianity is concerned in
America, which is that the religion of the majority in a society should strongly inform the culture
and values of that society while at the same time not infringing upon the rights of those minorities
who do not subscribe to the majority religion.

matters. See Giles Kepel, Jihad, 239. Finally, one should mention that this process of trying to reconcile
different ideas – for example liberalism versus the desire to create or at least maintain certain aspects of an
Islamic society that might also have illiberal elements – would be an ongoing one for Izetbegović, lasting
up to the day of his resignation as leader of the SDA in 2001.
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The problem is that unlike Neuhaus, who put a strong influence on such things as the
Constitution to act as a safeguard for minority rights, Izetbegović mentions no mechanism in the
Declaration which could act as a check on the potential tyranny of an Islamic society. This is
troubling, for although the sort of order that Izetbegović envisions would seem to be more benign
than, say, the sort of fearful totalitarianism which exists in states like Saudi Arabia, he is
nonetheless quite clear about wanting to establish an Islamic order which could theoretically be but need not be – democratic,28 and which contains features which many (including Muslims)
would find to be quite worrisome, not least because Izetbegović often describes such features in
rather vague and equivocal language. He writes, for example, of the legitimacy of private
property, but that it must also be used for the good of Islamic society. But one could ask - Who
decides what kind of private property is good for society, and what if certain minorities within
Islamic society object to the “correct” view of how private property should be exercised?29
Defenders of Izetbegović like Noel Malcolm or the great Croatian scholar Ivo Banac
respond to such criticisms by pointing out that in the Declaration, Izetbegović specifically states
that the sort of society he supports should only be established in places where there already exists
a Muslim majority, which would exclude a country like Bosnia (which Izetbegović does not
mention in the text). Yet the demographics of Bosnia would seem to call Malcolm’s and Banac’s
argument into question, for after the 1990 election Muslims made up 44% of the population
compared to 31% for the Serbs and 17% of Croats, not an absolute majority but pretty close to
it.30 Indeed, considering the high birth rate of the Muslims during the 20th century it would be
reasonable to assume that within a generation, Bosnian Muslims would have an absolute majority,
28

Perhaps the influence of the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood on Izetbegović can be seen here in his
somewhat nonchalant attitude towards the need for a Muslim society to have a democratic government.
The Muslim Brothers had a very non-national idea of Muslim governance, in which there was really no
need to think about what kind of nation-state should exist (after all, their dream was of some kind of
restored caliphate that would be supranational). One thinks of that moment during the 1920s when
Egyptian nationalists discussed the need for their country to have a democratic constitution, which inspired
members of the Brotherhood to respond, “The Koran is our constitution.” Kepel, Jihad, 27.
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thus creating the conditions for a total Islamic society in Bosnia. Certainly Izetbegović minces no
words on the need to overthrow an existing regime when the time is right – as he puts it, just as it
is wrong to overthrow a regime before the Islamic masses within that nation are ready for the sort
of society he proposes, it is also wrong not to overthrow a government when the Islamic masses
are ready for a more pure, Islamic society where “Islam [becomes] an order.”31 Not unreasonably
then might some Serbian and Croatian (and some Muslim) audiences worry about what kind of
Bosnia they would experience under an Izetbegović regime.32
During the 1970s Izetbegović alternated time it appears between his profession as a
lawyer and continuing his activities as a member of the Young Muslims, maintaining contacts
with foreigners who were members of the Muslim Brotherhood.33 The Communist secret police
told Izetbegović a few times to cease these activities, but he remained undeterred and was not
arrested for them. The Islamic Religious Community showed its loyalty to the regime by telling
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One can add to this individual observations Izetbegović makes which, while not necessarily bad per se
when viewed separately, taken cumulatively are rather worrisome – his admiration in many ways for the
theocratic tendencies of Pakistan, his rather uncritical affinity for the great expansion of Islam during the
early Middle Ages which coexists with his criticism of the same sort of Christian expansionism which
occurred later, his call for the banning of gambling and dance halls (something that would certainly not
amuse dance-loving Serbs and Croats). Simply chilling though is the animus Izetbegović expresses toward
Israel (he gives the usual European canard of distinguishing between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism) and
his call for the restoration of the zanat or the banning of interest, a policy for which he is willing to drop his
usual pacific stance and reinforce with the use of violence. Alija Izetbegović, Islamic Declaration, 25 28,
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philosophical speculation. Typical are Laura Silber and Allan Little, who covered the Yugoslav wars as
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among Muslims.” Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: Penguin
Books, 1997), 208. On the contrary, Izetbegović has a very clear and unambiguous political ideology in the
Declaration, one that he makes no bones about wanting to have enacted when the conditions in a particular
nation are right.
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the Declaration would be equivalent to southerners in the United States espousing a return to antebellum
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different imams to not support Izetbegović or his ideas.34 Izetbegović’s luck ran out when in
1983 he was finally arrested along with some other Young Muslims by the Communist
government and charged with conspiracy against the Yugoslav state.35 At his trial he was able to
do an excellent job portraying himself – and rightly so, one should add – as the victim of an
overzealous Communist system, something that would pay dividends for him down the road
when he ran for the presidency of Bosnia. For the time being, though, Izetbegović faced a long
period in confinement, with the judge sentencing him to fourteen years in prison.36
In 1984, while he was in prison, an English edition of his work Islam Between East and
West came out. Apparently Izetbegović had written much of it after he was released from prison
for the first time in 1949, but for whatever reason the entire work did not see the light of day until
much later. A more theologically and philosophically-oriented work than the Declaration,
Izetbegović’s purpose in Islam is basically to act as an apologist for the Islamic faith and to
demonstrate why he believes it to be true. Because Islam is less strident than the Declaration and
politics does not play as central a role (although certainly Izetbegović expresses a particular
political vision in Islam as well), it is tempting to see the work as representing the real and liberal
Izetbegović, although it probably makes more sense to just see the two works as expressing
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different (but equally representative) dimensions or aspects of Izetbegović’s basic world and
religious view.
A book basically of two parts, in the first part Izetbegović discusses all of the contrasts or
dualities which exist in the world – the beauty and freshness of life in the countryside versus the
often banal, anonymous, urban existence of the city, for example, or more generally the contrasts
between civilization and culture, science and art, the material world and the spiritual world, and
so on. Because of this duality in the world and as a result of man’s inability to achieve a
synthesis of different, seemingly irreconcilable values, Izetbegović argues that people are at a loss
as to how they can experience happiness or peace. He gives as an example advanced nations like
the U.S. or Sweden which are abundant in material wealth, yet where people are often unhappy or
depressed because they lack the necessary spiritual vision for true fulfillment – hence the terrible
problem of alcoholism that the Swedes have, or the huge crime rates of the Americans. And
although some ideas or systems are able to come closer than others in providing a genuine
synthesis for all the dualities in life, none of them are really able to hit the mark (e.g. Christianity,
which Izetbegović sees as a great and historic force, but also as inadequate because of the
artificial division it draws between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of this world).37
Only Islam, Izetbegović asserts in the second section, enables man to overcome the many
dualities in life and to affirm both his material and spiritual natures. For example, Izetbegović
argues that unlike in Christianity where the saint and warrior are valued separately, Islam is able
to recognize these two great archetypes in the same person, the shaheed. Another example is the
phenomenon of science; Izetbegović harkens back to the Middle Ages and discusses how religion
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and science were reconciled through the interest many Islamic thinkers had in contemplating the
heavens, leading them to become some of the great medieval astronomers. More generally,
Izetbegović believes, no dualities can exist within Islam but only syntheses, since such notions as
sacred versus profane, secular versus spiritual, or body versus spirit, are all difficulties that
Muslims do not have to deal with. Finally, because Islam is concerned not primarily with the
individual but the community, individuals are not separated from one another in anticipation of
some heavenly kingdom of believers (the Christian notion) but can actually experience true and
holy justice in this world (the Islamic notion), since again the Christian notion of Church versus
State just does not exist.38 Or as Izetbegović writes, Islam is able to start as “mysticism” and end
as a “state” – again, the religious and secular become one. This Islamic emphasis on synthesis is
an important one to keep in mind, for as we shall see it was an ideal that Izetbegović would try in
some ways to reach (especially during the Bosnian War), although with not much success and not
to everybody’s happiness.
Izetbegović continued to express his political and religious ideas in prose while in prison,
eventually filling 13 notebooks with penses on a wide range of subjects - from the ideas of the
American political scientist James Q. Wilson to the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset - which were
later published as Notes from Prison in 2002. Somewhat akin to the Lutheran Dietrich
Bonhoeffer’s Letters and Papers from Prison, Izetbegović deals with the pain of being in prison
by contemplating in true intellectual fashion such things as modern science, art, literature,
philosophy, film, and religion, but most of all the nature of Islam in the modern world. He
emerges from this work to this historian as someone who has apparently evolved in some ways
from the earlier militancy he sometimes expressed in the Declaration – a sense of liberalism and
a respect for the rights of minorities pervades Notes.39 Sadly, whether because of the stressful
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circumstances he found himself in or because of some lack of political ability, this empathy and
sophistication towards others that Izetbegović often expressed while in prison would tend, with
some exceptions, to be totally absent when he was actually called upon to exercise leadership
over the different Bosnian peoples in the early 1990s.
When Izetbegović was given early release in 1988, he realized that Yugoslavia was
approaching a period of transition and about to enter a new era.40 Actually, this transition had
already started to occur soon after Tito’s death on 4 May 1980, when previously forbidden
nationalist sentiments began to raise their heads. Serbian nationalist propaganda especially
started to come out in a steady stream, the most infamous example of which was the so-called
‘Memorandum’ written by members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences in 1986 and published
in its entirety for the Yugoslav public in 1989. A long essay which catalogued various grievances
of the Serbian peoples, much of the writers’ venom was directed against the 1974 Yugoslav
Constitution Tito created, which provided for the autonomy of the people of Voivodina and, more
significantly, the Kosovar Albanians in Serbia. Ever since 1974, the argument of the
‘Memorandum’ went, the Albanians had been repressing the Serbian people, a tendency that was
most notoriously demonstrated with the violence perpetrated in 1985 by some Albanians against a
Serbian farmer when they shoved a broken glass bottle up his anus.41 The Albanian persecution
was simply part and parcel of the general “genocide” that occurred against the Serbian people
over the several decades, whether it was in the form of “economic genocide” imposed by the
other Yugoslav republics on Serbia or of “cultural genocide” perpetrated by other Yugoslavs
against Serbian arts and letters. There was a need then, the writers argued, to provide for the
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“integrity” of the Serbian peoples in all of the Yugoslav republics.42 As Noel Malcolm rightly
says, the ‘Memorandum’ was “a virtual manifesto for the ‘Greater Serbian’ policies pursued by
Belgrade in the 1990s.”43
Some of this Serbian propaganda was also directed more specifically against Muslims,
who were portrayed either as fundamentalists who wanted to turn Yugoslavia into an Islamic
state, or as strange, unEuropean creatures. Vuk Drašković, a Serbian novelist who later became a
significant political figure and opponent of Slobodan Milošević, wrote a novel called “Nož” (The
Knife) in 1982 which was set during WWII and almost all of the Muslim characters in the work
were portrayed as murderers and as descendents of Serbs, who sold out by embracing Islam; a
political scientist and “specialist” in Islam, Miroljub Jevtic, argued that Muslims were subtly
infiltrating Yugoslav life through their high birthrate and construction of mosques – a gradual
prelude as he saw it to an Islamic revolution; Jovan Rasković, a leader of Krajina Serbs in
Croatia, espoused bizarre theories about the Muslims, arguing that the way to understand them
was to focus on their “anal fixation.” Especially emblematic of this sort of hysteria was a rather
clever caricature drawn (by the Serb Milenko Mihajlovic) during the 1980s for the Serbian
journal Literary Gazette, showing a Serbian baby being circumcised by an imam and blessed by a
Catholic bishop at the same time. Members of the Orthodox Church also often got into the act,
talking about the need for a greater Serbia to protect the Serbs from Islam, how Islamic
tendencies were diseases infecting Serbs, etc.44 Yet what is striking about much of this rhetoric is
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first, how much of it actually came from outside of Bosnia,45 and second, how abstract and
intellectual it all was. How much of this really filtered down to, say, the Bosnian Serb peasant
who worked next door to the Muslim farmer every day and said hello, or to the city worker who
saw the pretty Muslim girls in their tight shirts and mini-skirts?
To a lesser but still very real extent, Muslim nationalists started to become more vocal as
well. In spite of the increased privileges Tito had given to Muslims, they still tended in many
ways to be reticent as far as any expressions of ethnic or religious identity was concerned. By the
late 1980s Yugoslavia’s secularization had had its impact and Bosnian Muslims were
overwhelmingly secular,46 and those who remained religious either through conviction or through
a simple respect for tradition, tended to be quite private and quiet about whatever religious views
they held. Indeed, the scholar of Yugoslavia, Sabrina Ramet, argues that it was really the
Catholics and Orthodox who were able to be open about their beliefs during the Tito years Christians had been able to celebrate Christmas quite openly, something Muslims had not been
able to do with their own religious celebrations, and the Muslim magazine Preporod did not write
about public issues in the way an Orthodox magazine like Pravoslavje did, which often took an
anti-Kosovo and nationalist stance. Also, since Bosnia had a tougher police apparatus, it had
been more likely to clamp down on Muslims than Zagreb on Catholics or Belgrade on
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Orthodox.47 There were certainly Muslims who were resentful of this treatment, and with the end
of Communist rule they began to be more assertive. Thus on TV in 1990 viewers could watch
Muslim rallies where there were green banners with Arabic inscriptions and women wearing
traditional Islamic clothing, or Preporod printed a nationalist article which quoted the novelist
Mehmed Selimović, “Bosnians belong to no one. Settled in the middle of a crossroad, we were
always being given to someone as a dowry.”48 Many Muslims were determined that they would
no longer be seen as Bosnian Christians’ dowry,49 and they would soon find a strong defender of
this position in Izetbegović.50
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Chapter Two
The Choice Between Conflict or Accommodation51
Although it may very well be apocryphal, this remark is often attributed to Otto von
Bismarck: “God has a special place in his heart for children, drunks, and the United States.”
Concerning the last part of the anecdote, this historian has always interpreted it as suggesting that
God has been especially beneficent during the times of turmoil and transition in the U.S., granting
the nation intelligent leaders to guide her people when the going gets tough. Hence Lincoln
during the period of the Civil War, or FDR during the Depression. In a diametrically opposed
manner, Providence has perhaps been rather lacking concerning the history of Yugoslavia, a
nation that has not necessarily been short of political talent but has often lacked leaders who were
suitable to the particular moment the Yugoslavs were in. There was probably not a period in
which this was more true than during the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period of transition and
great uncertainty in Yugoslavia when leaders with tact, prudence, respect for history, and certain
magnanimity were greatly needed - especially concerning the problem of nationalism - but sadly
were never able to rise to the occasion.52
To be sure, the situation at this time was a remarkably difficult one, in which the
temptations for leaders to use nationalism to pursue certain purposes were immense, and the
opportunities for statesmen to maintain moderate views which took into account the interests of
the different Yugoslav republics or ethnicities - other than the ones they represented - were often
extremely limited. This should hardly be seen as surprising, since in many ways the Yugoslav
state was on its last legs at this time, having suffered since its inception in 1918 from a lack of
legitimacy, as the scholar Sabrina Ramet argues. Whether it was during the years between the
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two world wars, when the Karañorñević dynasty was seen by almost all ethnic groups as unfairly
favoring Serbs, or decades later during the so-called “Golden Age” of the Communist period,
when something as seemingly mundane as reconstructing the “Brotherhood and Unity” highway
across Yugoslavia beginning in 1975 was the source of incredible friction between the different
republics concerning how public monies should fairly be used,53 many of the different Yugoslav
nations and ethnicities had never really felt that their aspirations and interests were being
represented in a fair and democratic way by their Communist leaders. Even under such a wily
leader as Josip Tito (who knew how to both suppress and allow certain freedoms) and during
relatively good economic times as during the late 1970s, the Yugoslav political “equilibrium was
unstable” because of such things as the approaching economic collapse (mainly as a result of the
foreign debt Yugoslavia was accruing), the substitution of pseudo-democratic rule (e.g. allowing
the Yugoslav republics and provinces to exercise more powers) for real democratization (e.g.
allowing multi-party elections), and the incongruity between real brotherhood and unity and the
continued emphasis on ethnicity. By 1989, when Communist governments were starting to
collapse all over eastern Europe, when leaders like Slobodan Milošević were continually
emphasizing “the national question” as it was euphemistically called, and when within
Yugoslavia inflation was at 1,000% by the end of the year, “There was a growing sense that it
[Yugoslavia] was breathing its last breath.”54
The problem though was figuring out what might replace this Yugoslavia which seemed
to be in her death-throes. For if Yugoslavia were to be broken up into different new nation-states,
there was the difficulty of the new minorities who would also come into existence. As the
Balkans scholar, Gale Stokes, thoughtfully describes the dilemma, Yugoslavia was at the tail end
of a process that had begun in the 1870s and had continued after World War I in eastern Europe
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with the dissolution of great empires, which was that of nation-building and the problem that
came with this of vulnerable minorities coming to be within these new nations. The problem was
not of ethnic hatreds, he argues, but of new nations and new minorities.55 Countries like, say,
Czechoslovakia, or Poland, had had to deal with the problems of ethnic minorities (Sudeten
Germans and Ukrainians/Germans respectively) when they came into being as new nation-states
after World War II, and now it was Yugoslavia’s turn to deal with the problem (or to be more
accurate, now Croatia’s, Bosnia’s, Macedonia’s and Serbia’s/Yugoslavia’s, and later during the
new millennium Kosovo’s and Montenegro’s, since these were the actual nation-states that would
soon come into being). Considering that the minorities problems of Czechoslovakia and Poland –
as well as many other eastern European nations over the last 140 years or so - were eventually
dealt with through either painful expulsions of minorities (the Czechoslovak case) or the
expulsions of minorities and the harsh redrawing of borders (the Polish case), this did not auger
well for Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Since all the different Yugoslav ethnic groups were
beginning to become afraid that they might eventually become one of these minority groups
subject to the violence of uncaring majorities, it is quite natural that they would look to leaders
who would uncompromisingly support them, even if these particular leaders seemed uncaring
towards other Yugoslav ethnicities.
Unsurprisingly in this new atmosphere then, leaders came out of the woodwork who
totally disregarded the rulebook used by the Communists for the previous forty years, as Sabrina
Ramet put it describing Slobodan Milošević (although her words could just as easily describe
political figures like Franjo Tuñman and to a much lesser extent even Alija Izetbegović).56
Rather than avoid the issue of nationalism or at least moderate its expression, again as Tito and all
the previous Yugoslav rulers had done, these new leaders not only did not avoid it but endlessly
dwelt on it to an unhealthy degree, focusing on historical slights and wrongs that had been done
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in the past to their particular ethnicity and bringing all the old negative ghosts back from the dead.
Rather than using consensus between the different political nations in Yugoslavia in order to
achieve political objectives, these leaders appealed to threats of violence against other ethnicities
and the mobbish crowds. And rather than carefully consider how their actions and words could
be construed by other ethnicities and their political opponents, these figures often threw caution
to the winds and polarized a society at the very time in which Tito’s “brotherhood and unity”
were most needed.
This is not to say that any discussion of ethnicity or nationalism (or more positively,
patriotism) would have been wrong at this time, or that talking about the past would inevitably
have opened a Pandora’s Box of “ancient ethnic hatreds”57 between the different Yugoslav
nations that a strong leader like Tito had managed to keep submerged but which would now rise
to the surface. Discussions of ethnicity or of nationhood, as events in Yugoslavia were to quickly
show, was inevitable, and could have even been salutary if addressed by Yugoslav leaders in a
manner which both affirmed allegiance to an ethnic tradition while at the same time
acknowledging that this was not everything and that ethnic identification had to be balanced with
a respect for – and a willingness to compromise with – other ethnic groups if violence or war
within Yugoslavia were to be avoided. The challenge for these leaders, of course, was finding
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ways of striking this delicate balance in the incredibly chaotic and stressful atmosphere they were
in – a remarkably tall order, to say the least.
`

Conflict then within Yugoslavia accompanied by a certain level of violence was rather

likely at the end of the Cold War, simply because of this problem of large minorities in almost all
of the Yugoslav republics (Kosovar Albanians and the people of Voivodina in Serbia, not to
mention a significant number of Muslims in the Sandžak; Serbs in Croatia; Muslims, Serbs, and
Croats in Bosnia; Albanians and Serbs in Macedonia, etc). Perhaps if there had been a greater
tradition of democracy in Yugoslavia in which ethnic differences had been settled in a liberal
manner the problem might have been more manageable, but unfortunately such a tradition did not
really exist. As the great dissident Milovan ðilas puts the matter, Bosnia did not have “a critical
history” in which a “democratic consciousness” had taken root before the Bosnian War, thus
making it most difficult for Bosnian politicians during the late 1980s and early 1990s to appeal to
the Bosnian public in liberal, non-ethnic terms.58 Because of this factor59 as well as the others
just mentioned, as Izetbegović embarked on his political career he would face a great challenge in
trying to present himself in a purely non-ethnic, democratic fashion.
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As far as the cast of characters of the Yugoslav conflict are concerned, they are quite
familiar to most educated readers at this point, and will be discussed simply to the show how they
contributed to the radicalization of Yugoslav society. There was, first and foremost, because of
the power he had as the leader of the most populous republic and the control he had over the
federal army the JNA (Jugoslovenska narodna armija), the Serbian president Slobodan
Milošević, who more than anybody else was responsible for the hell that the former Yugoslavia
would become. Never a terribly dynamic speaker or charismatic presence, Milošević nonetheless
had a remarkable ability to strike certain nationalistic chords which appealed to many – although
certainly not to all - of the Serbian peoples in Yugoslavia, while at the same time putting the nonSerbs increasingly on the edge. Combined with this was his skill, undoubtedly built up during his
career in banking and the Communist party, of ruthlessly manipulating the various Yugoslav
institutions to his own ends, supporting those figures who supported him while pushing out the
rest. Yet what was perhaps most frightening about Milošević was his extraordinary success
during the first few years of his reign, surviving under circumstances that might have caused
other leaders in his position to be overthrown. Different Yugoslav peoples either hoped – or
feared – that he was some unstoppable force, because of his remarkable capacity to incrementally
extend Serbian hegemony throughout Serbian parts of Yugoslavia.
Starting in Kosovo in 1987, where he famously told Serbs that “Nobody should dare to
beat you!” (this “nobody”, of course, being the Kosovar Albanians), Milošević was able to very
quickly gain recognition by the Serbs of Yugoslavia for whom, especially those who lived in
Serbia, Kosovo was the issue, the lightening rod that could force even relatively moderate Serbs
into a kind of frenzy.60 He capitalized on this support to push out his former mentor and best man
at his wedding, Ivan Stambolić, to become leader of Serbia, an early example of Milošević’s
willingness to throw any former ally under the bus. From here Milošević used a mob of 15,000 to
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march in the city of Novi Sad in 1988 to intimidate the Voivodian leadership into resigning (this
event was hitherto referred to as the ‘Yoghurt Revolution’ because the protestors pelted the
Voivodina government building with rocks and yoghurt). The Voivodian leaders were then
replaced by those who owed all their authority to Milošević.61 In 1989, Milošević turned his
sights again on Kosovo, a year in which he was able to end that province’s autonomy (on 23
March Serbian tanks parked in front of the Kosovo provincial assembly and security police inside
the building helped to provide the necessary incentive for the Kosovar legislators to pass the
needed legislation) and give his great speech at the fields of Kosovo Polje on 28 June
commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Blackbirds, where he said “After six
centuries we are again engaged in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, but this
cannot be excluded yet.”62 Also during this year crowds of marchers were able to bring down the
executive leaders in Montenegro, to be replaced by supporters of Milošević, and Macedonia also
became basically a satellite of Serbia.63 With his control now over five of the eight members of
the federal presidency (one member for each republic, as well as for Voivodina and Kosovo),
many Yugoslavs were afraid that he was poised to totally take over the entire state and put a
Greater Serbia into place.64
Milošević was no less successful with the various Serbian bureaucracies, most notably
the media, that all-important institution which was crucial in promoting both him and his
nationalist agenda. Again, it all started in 1987, when Milošević was able to get TV Belgrade to
play his “No one should dare beat you speech!” again and again; it was partly for this reason that
everybody in Yugoslavia eventually knew about it. The prestigious newspaper Politika, an
honorable institution within Yugoslavia, became during the late 1980s simply a mouthpiece of
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Milošević, with reporters not honestly covering such things as internal dissent within Serbia while
at the same time fanning the flames of nationalism. Journalists in different media outlets who did
not toe the Milošević line were canned, to be replaced by those who did.65 Milošević was also
able to co-opt much of the Orthodox Church into supporting his nationalism, with Serbian priests
reciprocating the suddenly flattering treatment they were receiving in the press after years of
indifference by the Communist state. A good example of this was Patriarch Pavle’s opening of
the Church Sabor in 1991, not in Belgrade as tradition dictated, but in Jasenovac to commemorate
the 50th anniversary of the suffering of the Serbs during World War II,66 an act which would have
been expressly forbidden just a few years earlier.
Not far behind Milošević in bellicosity was Franjo Tuñman, the president of Croatia
elected in April of 1990. A pseudo-historian of odd obsessions who, unlike Milošević - who used
ideology mainly to further his own career and who could easily disregard it when it was
opportune - Tuñman seemed to really believe in the different aspects of his rather depraved
Croatian nationalism. It was a nationalism fueled by dark but deeply held convictions, whether it
was his belief that only 30,000 Serbs altogether were murdered at the Croatian concentration
camp of Jasenovac during World War II67 or his absolute faith that Bosnian Muslims were simply
Croats and that any region with Bosnian Muslims should simply be considered an extension of
Croatia.68 Also unlike Milošević, who tended to know just how far to go with his rhetoric,
Tuñman had a remarkable ability to blurt out his honest feelings and cause offense, as he did at
the 17 March 1990 rally when he remarked that “Thank God my wife is not a Jew or a Serb,” or
at his first post-election press conference when he said that Bosnia and Croatia were one natural
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geographic and economic unit.69 But like Milošević, he did all he could to control the media in
his own nation as well promote only those politicians and bureaucrats who would be his lackeys.
The fact that he was at the end not able to equal the destruction that Milošević wrought on the
former Yugoslavia, although he was certainly able to make his contribution, was in many ways
due to lack of military resources more than anything else.
It was not for nothing then that Izetbegović once famously said “that choosing between
Tuñman and Milošević was like having to choose between leukaemia and a brain tumour…”70
Indeed, Bosnia at this time faced the kind of dilemma that Poland has often had to deal with in
her history, of being between two ravenous neighbors who are just waiting to divvy her up. Yet
in a sense Bosnia’s situation was even worse than Poland’s, for in addition to the external threats
there were all sorts of sympathetic Bosnian Serbs and Croats who Milošević and Tuñman
respectively could use to subvert Bosnia from within. As early as 1989, for instance, Milošević
showed his typical contempt for the rule of law by illegally sending Serbian agents into Bosnia to
gather intelligence as well as to propagate stories that Muslims were mistreating Serbian priests
and children in order to sow ethnic division.71 Or consider Tuñman, who showed in September of
1990 (just two months before the elections) who really was in control of the HDZ (Hrvatska
demokratska zajednica, or Croatian Democratic Union, the party Tuñman and others created) in
Bosnia by removing the first candidate for the post of president of that political party because that
individual was not a pure Croat - his father was a Serb (Milošević had the same sort of control
over the SDS – Srpska demokratska stranka, or Serbian Democratic Party, although he tended to
be much more subtle about his influence than Tuñman).72 In essence then Bosnia, and eventually
Izetbegović, was facing a situation of having two big guns pointing at her from either side,
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creating a rather threatening atmosphere in which the various Bosnian Serb, Muslim, and Croat
factions had an incentive to act more erratically than they might have.
In spite of all of this Bosnians were still able to be rather detached about what was
occurring elsewhere in Yugoslavia - for a while anyway. One of the prominent journalists of the
Yugoslav wars, Misha Glenny, notes that when he went into Bosnia after covering the war in
Croatia in 1991, he felt that he had entered a new world, in which Serbs, Croats, and Muslims
alike were able to basically ignore what was happening just kilometers away.73 Undoubtedly this
Bosnian sense of being above it all was in many ways wishful thinking, a kind of anesthetic they
used to numb themselves to dangers they should have been confronting more honestly, but still,
this sense was real for all of that. Although there were certainly undercurrents of fear and
foreboding beneath the surface, for the most part the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats were still
maintaining the sort of basically peaceful relations that they had had for many decades. Exhibit
A of all of this was Radovan Karadžić – future Bosnian Serb nationalist and leader of the SDS,
ethnic cleanser, and war criminal - but who at this point in time right before his assumption of a
political career was simply seen as another psychiatrist in Sarajevo who had always gotten along
with the Muslims, many of whom he had given free medical care. As he put it in a 1990
interview, most Bosnian Muslims were not radical but cosmopolitan and European; if he had a
problem it was with the Croats, who had acted so horribly to the Serbs during the Second World
War.74 This sort of common-sensical understanding of their different ethnic neighbors, which
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contained an awareness of their differences but which also saw their commonalities, was shared
by much of the Bosnian population, with its most strongly held by the Muslims but to an extent
by many Croats and Serbs as well. But even if it is possible that this sense of goodwill was
somewhat less real than it seemed, there was most likely little desire in the hearts of most
Bosnians to totally polarize their society along ethnic lines. This can be seen in polls at around
this general time period, polls which - like all polls - should be regarded skeptically, but which
appear to have thoughtfully gauged Bosnian public opinion. In 1990, for instance, 74% of
Bosnians were against the creation of nationalist parties, and even as late as November of 1991,
when the tenor of Bosnian civility and cooperation between the different ethnic groups had
almost totally disintegrated, 95.5% of Muslims, 72.4% of Croats, and even a majority of Serbs –
67% - were still opposed to the division of Bosnia by ethnicity.75 However naïvely cosmopolitan
on one hand or intransigently nationalistic on the other a lot of the Bosnians might have been,
most of them were not completely stupid – they knew what a totally fractured and divided Bosnia
would mean and how it all could lead to a repetition of the nightmares their parents and
grandparents had told them during constant evenings over the years about what had occurred only
four decades earlier during the war.
Still, in spite of the good reasons for why it made sense for Bosnians to resist the
temptations of ethnic separatism, tensions nonetheless started to increase within Bosnia in 1990
as the November elections came closer. Izetbegović was entering a realm then that would require
incredible deftness on his part. He had to, on one hand, recognize the real and in many ways
quite legitimate national aspirations the Muslims of Bosnia (and all of Yugoslavia, for that
matter) had, who could with some plausibility truthfully argue that in spite of whatever privileges
which aimed to give the republics more power, the creation in 1974 of autonomy for Kosovo and
Voivodina, the increasing power he gave to the Kosovar Albanians – these were the sources of the major
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Tito had given them they had often had to be quiet and meek about their ethnic identity and/or
religious faith. A politician cannot do any good if he is not elected, and if Izetbegović wanted to
receive votes he had to be willing to espouse a certain kind of Islamic patriotism/nationalism. At
the same time Izetbegović had to be cognizant of certain fears Bosnian Christians had of a
resurgent Ottoman Empire or neo-Islamic state that, however unhinged these fears may have
often been, were nonetheless there. The fact that in the past Izetbegović had espoused the
creation of semi-theocratic state and was well known as a fervent Muslim dissident certainly did
not make his job any easier, since even well-intentioned remarks he might make about the role
Islam should play in Bosnian society could easily be twisted by nationalists and demagogues to
suggest that Muslims in Izetbegović’s Bosnia would be suppressing the rights of Orthodox and
Catholics. Yet if there was to be any realistic hope of keeping Bosnia together he had to persuade
Serbs and Croats that they would be equal citizens, a task made rather difficult by the
nationalistic rhetoric already being espoused by Tuñman and Milošević outside of Bosnia, not to
mention the political clout they exercised within. Such a task of straddling the gulf dividing
Islamic nationalism on one side and democratic multi-culturalism on the other might have been
beyond the capacities of even the most talented democratic statesman – considering that
Izetbegović had virtually no experience in politics it was for him probably pretty close to
impossible.
Nonetheless, in some ways Izetbegović at least tried. On 27 March 1990 when
Izetbegović’s political party was officially founded at the Sarajevo Holiday Inn, he read a
statement signed by 40 of the founders of the SDA (Stranka demokratske akcije, or Party of
Democratic Action) which was meant to inform the public of the party’s basic principles as a
democratic political body (although it was not a formal depiction of the SDA’s program).
Notable among these principles was the desire to maintain Yugoslavia “as a community of
peoples and nations;” the affirmation of the SDA as a political party which was made up of
Muslims and Muslim interests and of those non-Muslims who were supportive of the goals of the
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SDA; the necessity for democracy, the rule of law, and human rights as set out by the United
Nation’s Universal Declarations of Human Rights charter; the need for different political parties;
the need for the protection of minorities; the right to private property; the need for free markets;
and the legitimacy of the Serbs and Croats as well as the Muslims existing as legitimate peoples
in Bosnia. All in all the statement was a profoundly democratic one, which unlike Izetbegović’s
Islamic Declaration clearly called for checks and balances against any sort of tyranny of the
majority. Even in areas of the statement which suggested Izetbegović’s penchant for state
intrusion into personal lives, most notably in the section which stated that “our endeavors will be
directed against all forms of pseudo culture in the shape of pulp literature, pornography, etc,”
such prohibitions the SDA argued should be achieved through basically liberal and democratic
means (taxes, bans on advertising, zones and periods of partial prohibition, etc.).”76 One could
argue (or at least hope) that the statement represented the sort of Bosnia Izetbegović himself
really wanted, before circumstances and other Muslims within his party would force him off into
a more radical direction – a Bosnia that would perhaps be a little more Islamic oriented than some
people might like, a little too deferential to the idea of a Bosnia which because of its Muslim
plurality would have a strong Muslim feel, a bit too Puritan with the restrictions on pornography
and all of that - but nonetheless a democracy in which the rights both of the majority and minority
would be honored.77
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But considering how Bosnia was already starting to feel the tremors of nationalistic
murmurings from outside and which were even starting to infiltrate the republic itself, was this
simple espousal of the SDA’s commitment to democratic politics enough? Perhaps the moment
called for something more, especially as it was at the beginning of a new era and a time when the
first real opportunity for open campaigning and honest rhetoric after decades of Communist
repression was occurring. A brief window was open in which Izetbegović might have brought up
such painful issues as the involvement of Muslims in some of the murderous rampages which
occurred during World War II, or even more distantly the authoritarianism of the Ottoman
Empire under which the rights of many Bosnian Christians had been suppressed, in an effort to
offer some form of atonement for the past as well as to assure Bosnian Christians that none of
those horrors would be repeated. Certainly the scholar Bat Ye’or would agree with this. She
cites some remarks Izetbegović gave during an August 1992 interview (after the war started, it
should be noted) in which he said, among other things, that there was a 500 year old tradition of
tolerance on the part of Muslims in Sarajevo towards people of other faiths. It is such a
nonchalant statement as this one, Ye’or believes, that suppressed or denied the negative impact
that the Ottoman Empire had had on the Serbs, thus leading to the horrific violence of the 19921995 Bosnian War. Because there had been no honest dialogue about the oppression Christians
experienced for five long centuries while under Turkish rule, “history unleashed a barbarous
war.”78
Ye’or, in the arguments she makes – which, incidentally, most Serbophiles would totally
sympathize with - goes way too far in this historian’s opinion in her insistence on some kind of
unbroken line linking the oppression that Christians underwent at the hands of the Turks and
Muslims with the violence of the 1990s, as though the former inevitably caused the latter to
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occur. To begin with, from a purely philosophical point of view this is a mindless determinism, a
condescending, the devil-made-me-do-it sort of attitude towards the Bosnian Croats and Serbs
which denies any notion of free will or the ability to make distinctions on their part - that because
they heard nasty stories from their grandparents about how the Muslims treated their ancestors a
hundred years ago this somehow predisposed them to view their contemporary Muslim neighbors
in a similar light, especially when these Muslims (or their politicians) said or did anything
reminiscent of the long-extinct Ottoman Empire. Besides, all the historical evidence points to a
more complicated portrayal of Muslim-Christian relations – for every instance of tension between
these ethnic groups one can just as easily document examples of cooperation and peaceful coexistence.79 Consider the 19th century, when Serbian nationalism both within and without Bosnia
became an extremely potent force and when much of this fervor was strongly fueled by an antiOttoman and anti-Islamic bias. Even with this antipathy towards the Muslims though there were
many examples of Christians working with Muslims, especially concerning the often common
Muslim/Christian desire to curb either the abuses of the Ottoman Empire or of the Muslim
landlords within Bosnia. In the 1860s, for instance, a pamphlet from Serbia was issued to the
Muslims in Bosnia seeking their cooperation against the Ottomans – “regardless of religious
differences, brothers: by God, language, and fatherland.” Also at this time Christians and
Muslims protested together against the high taxes they had to undergo (and conversely, there
were wealthy Serbs who made common cause with the wealthy Muslim begs in an effort to
maintain their privileges in areas like tax-farming).80 Also, in spite of whatever anger they felt
towards each other generally, Muslims and Christians lived much of their normal lives with their
neighbors in relative harmony. A Swiss doctor who lived in Sarajevo during this time observed
79
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how during the late 1850s and early 1860s Serb and Muslim peasants would picnic on Sundays
on a hillside, with no signs of rancor towards one another. And a little later, in 1897, an English
visitor to the region commented on the fact that the Christians in Bosnia seemed to have little
bitterness towards the Muslims, and that if some sort of land reform could come about then the
major source of remaining grievances that the Christians had against their former masters would
be eliminated.81
Ye’or also fails to note a rather obvious fact, which is that by the end of World War I the
tables had turned and Christians – notably the Serbs - now exercised a powerful hegemony in the
newly created Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It was at this time, most
significantly, that meaningful land reform was instituted, ending the major grievance that
Christians had had against the Muslims. Large Muslim estates were cut up with land going
eventually to 113,000, mostly Serbian, tenant families, and peasants were freed from the
obligations that they had to their former, often Muslim, lords. Scores were also settled during this
time, with Serbian peasants often attacking Muslims who had earlier intimidated Serbs during the
First World War in their capacity as members of Austria’s Schutzkorps.82 It was also between the
two world wars that almost all important political offices were exercised by the Serbs.83
Admittedly, the Second World War does provide some more evidence of an anti-Serb
role being played by Muslims, most notably concerning the notorious SS Handžar (“Dagger”)
division recruited by Heinrich Himmler that approximately 1 in 30 Islamic Bosnians joined – a
very small minority to be sure, but nonetheless a rather disproportionate and significant minority
to join such a vile organization (It must be said though that most Bosnian Muslims joined the SS
not out of any anti-Serb motive but in order to protect their towns and villages).84 Especially at

81

Malcolm, Bosnia, 129-130, 149.
Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia, The History of an Idea (New York: New York University Press, 2002),
117-118.
83
A typical example - the prime minister of Yugoslavia was a Serb for 264 of 268 months of the interwar
kingdom’s existence. Sabrina Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 38.
84
Malcolm, Bosnia, 190.
82

41

the beginning of the German and Italian occupation, many Bosnian Muslims sympathized with
the Ustaše government, in large part no doubt due to the fear these Muslims had of the Četniks
who had perpetuated massacres against them. To an extent Serbs were also given a deceptive
role of the influence of Muslims in the murder of Serbs, since at times Ustaše officials would
dress up in Muslim robes when murdering Serbs. Finally, in Sarajevo Muslims were able to take
over many Serbian businesses under the Ustaše regime and do quite well financially, something
that did not only irritate the Serbs but the Croats as well - who felt as privileged ethnics that they
deserved a greater share of the loot.85 Yet although Muslims certainly played a part in the
particularly cruel acts which occurred in Yugoslavia, their actions were simply par for the course
at a time in which Serbs and Croats also contributed more than their fair share. As the Serbian
historian Stevan K. Pavlowitch rightly describes it, violence fed upon violence during this time,
and “Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims in the mixed regions became locked in a vicious circle,
each willing to eradicate others from its territory…”86
It has been necessary to go into this modern Bosnian history in some detail in order to
demonstrate that Ye’or’s views, as well as the views of many of her contemporaries (including a
few scholars) who mindlessly subscribe to a simplistic “ethnic hatreds” paradigm of Balkan
history, are overly simplistic. In denying the main thrust of her thesis though, one should not go
so far as to just deny or repudiate it altogether. Even though Serbs (and to an extent also
Croats)87 have undoubtedly often wallowed in their suffering at the hands of the Ottomans and
Muslims to an unhealthy degree, this time period was a painful experience for them, after all, and
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an integral part of their history. Many Balkan scholars tend to diminish, while not quite denying,
the negative aspects of the Ottoman Empire, thus in some ways implying that things during that
epoch – which after all lasted four centuries – were really not so bad for the Bosnian Christians.
This is a line of reasoning that is rather difficult to sustain, for one cannot go through this time
period and find any time in which Bosnian Christians did not enjoy inferior status under their
Muslim betters. From the phenomenon of the devşirme during the 15th to 18th centuries, when
Bosnian Christian boys were taken away from their families to be trained as Muslim janissaries in
Istanbul88 (so memorably depicted by Ivo Andrić in his The Bridge on the Drina), to the
innumerable restrictions against Christians’ building churches or participating in certain
professions or even wearing certain clothing (admittedly not always enforced, but none the less
offensive),89 to the judicial discrimination they faced in being unable to be witnesses in trials
because they were not Muslim (a practice which while banned in the 19th century nonetheless
persisted until the end of the Ottoman Empire),90 to the land privileges which Muslims had over
Christians, to finally the great temptation of Bosnian Christians to commit apostasy in the eyes of
their religious brethren by converting to Islam so that they could truly be equal citizens91 – all of
these factors combined to make life burdensome for Bosnian Christians.92 Even when Bosnia
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came under Austro-Hungarian control in 1878, Bosnian Serbs were not able to institute land
reforms because a coalition of Muslims and Croats blocked such legislation93 (something that
Bosnian Serbs with long memories were perhaps fearful would happen again in the 1990s). It
was only under the founding of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918 that Serbs
were able to feel they were equal citizens.
It should not be surprising then that just 70 years later Bosnian Serbs would not
unreasonably feel a little trepidation about any Muslim leading Bosnia. The fact that this leader
was Izetbegović, known publicly as a dissident and fervent Muslim and author of the Islamic
Declaration, probably added to this agitation. It might have been prudent then for Izetbegović to
have made some kind of speech in which he openly sympathized with the Bosnian Christians and
the painful memories they had, before Bosnia became hopelessly polarized by propaganda and
the military actions going on and when such a peace offering might have had a limited chance of
success. Such a speech need not have been groveling, but simply an honest admission that the
Ottoman Empire had been something painful for Bosnian Serbs and Croats and that such
oppression as had occurred during that period would never happen again. He could have also
used such an opportunity to totally repudiate his Islamic Declaration and not just say, as he often
would in the subsequent years, that simply the conditions of Bosnia made implementation of the
Declaration impossible.94 Whether such an effort would have really made a difference in the
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long run is rather questionable when one again considers how individuals like Tuñman and
Milošević were already heavily adding to the polarizing atmosphere within Yugoslavia, but at
least Izetbegović could have answered some of the criticisms made of him about his supposed
Islamism as well as pre-empted some of the vile propaganda attacks that he should have known
were destined to come sooner or later.
To be fair to Izetbegović though, perhaps such a speech would have been politically
unpalatable to the Bosnian Muslim population - a case of blaming the victim, as it were. After
all, why should Izetbegović have gone out of his way to apologize for the Ottoman past of Bosnia
or for his own past when leaders like Milošević and Tuñman were already doing their worst to
stir up nationalist antagonisms against Bosnian Muslims? Besides, the political need to
emphasize religious particularity and to make no apologies about ethnic identity was beginning to
be just too great, and so Izetbegović understandably decided to veer between his avowals of the
multi-ethnicity of Bosnia on one hand with a strong emphasis on Islam and Islamic identity on the
other. Consider a speech he gave to some Muslim electors:
Free elections are coming, and with them the day that the Muslim nation has been waiting for
more than a hundred years [this historian’s italics]. This is a historic moment, in which there can
be no ‘don’t knows’ or neutrals…. That is why I am asking you to help on that day, by voting for
the SDA, for liberty, and for Muslims. The other Yugoslav nations are going to do it for
themselves. Why should the Muslims of Yugoslavia be the exception?95

Needless to say, Izetbegović’s insinuation here of a return to the good old days of the Ottoman
Empire could not have been better calculated to arouse the Serbs’ and Croats’ concerns and fears.
Absent here is any appeal to universality, of the need to understand the needs and desires of the
other ethnic groups, or of even the legitimacy of differing opinions among the Muslims
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themselves. At the same time, such an appeal to the past was perhaps the sort of red meat any
successful candidate needed to throw out at this time of increasing ethnic tension. After all, all
sorts of Serbian politicians were harkening back to the medieval Serbian Empire of Dušan in
order to justify their calls for a Greater Serbian, so it is not surprising that Izetbegović would
perhaps feel the need to hit back by referring to the Ottoman past of Bosnia’s Muslims. Harder to
justify though is what can only be assumed to be Izetbegović’s gratuitous assent to a prominent
HDZ campaign poster used during the 1990 campaign, which had the Islamic crescent and the
Catholic cross on it but not the Orthodox cross, something that could easily be seen as a
deliberate snub to the Bosnian Serbs.96
But again, Izetbegović was hardly alone in appealing to ethnic themes, with many
members of the two other ethnic parties being just as bad in their efforts to gain as many votes as
possible (as well as to encourage an ethnic separatism that they hoped would lead in the future to
the eventual partition of Bosnia). Not being content to simply positively affirm their own ethnic
identity, the SDS and HDZ not-so-subtly brought up the previously taboo topic of World War II,
with Serbian politicians talking about Ustaše massacres and Croatian politicians about murders
they had experienced at the hands of the Partisans. Quite likely, such negative reflections on the
past encouraged the Muslims to also dwell on past grievances: On 25 August 1990 in Foča
100,000 people attended a SDA commemoration of a massacre of thousands of Muslims by
Četniks during the war.97 Perhaps if these sorts of references to the past had been thoughtfully
and tactfully coordinated by all three ethnic groups together they could have provided some sort
of catharsis and healing of old wounds, but emotions were simply becoming too strong for this to
have had a realistic chance of occurring.98
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Because of this heightened focus on ethnicity during the campaign, as well as the more
politically mundane need to get votes, another road that Izetbegović felt he could not take was the
one that would have involved more efforts on his part to build some kind of potential governing
coalition that would have had a real trans-national appeal. He would build sort of a coalition with
the Croats and Serbs later on during the campaign, as we shall see, but this was in many ways a
marriage-of convenience designed mainly to ensure that the nationalist parties would not take
votes from each other. No effort at all was made to try to form a coalition with the Reform party
and the former Communist parties.99 Instead there was the sort of negative attitude SDA VicePresident Muhamed Čengić incarnated at a stadium rally of 40,000, where he strongly slammed
Ante Marković, the head of the Reform Party throughout Yugoslavia, since Cengic and the SDA
were afraid that Marković’s party would take away Muslim votes.100 Yet by encouraging this sort
of thing Izetbegović was burning bridges to a party that later could have lent him more support
for a united, multi-ethnic Bosnia.101
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Along the same lines, Izetbegović chose not to do as much as he might have to broaden
his own SDA party and prevent it from being more dominated by its hard-line, nationalist, more
religiously-oriented faction. At first Izetbegović had the support of Adil Zulfikarpašić, a
prominent and wealthy Bosnian émigré who had lived in Switzerland during the Communist
years, but who was now back in Bosnia and had helped in the formation of the SDA. A Muslim
of a more secularist orientation who strongly believed in pluralism and openness, Zulfikarpašić
might have been able to broaden the party, but the actions of Izetbegović and the SDA eventually
persuaded him to leave and form his own party, the MBO (Muslim Bosniak Organization).
Zulfikarpašić had been angered, for one, by the SDA’s preference for Fikret Abdić over him for
one of the two Muslim slots of the Bosnian presidency (with Izetbegović presumably occupying
the second one), even though Abdić had been convicted in 1987 for a bizarre financial scandal
involving his conglomerate Agrokomerc in northwestern Bosnia. But Abdić had a cult-like
following of thousands of Muslims where he had employed many of them in his company, and he
could bring these voters in the SDA fold, so there was a political need to offer him the
presidency102 (Considering that Abdić probably attempted a coup against Izetbegović in 1992
when the latter was kidnapped by the JNA, and later raised his own Muslim army that fought
against Izetbegović’s Bosnian forces, this was probably not the best choice. Yet considering that
Abdić was able to make the SDA a more mass-oriented political party103 when he was initially
recruited, Izetbegović’s decision to offer him one of the presidencies made a good deal of sense).
Zulfikarpašić also got disgusted by what he saw as the growing Islamization of the SDA, which
manifested itself at a September 1990 rally in the city of Velika Kladuša where members of a
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crowd of a hundred thousand or more were yelling things like “Long live Saddam Hussein!” and
“We’ll kill Vuk [Drašković]!” and hundreds were waving green, Islamic flags.104
Yet in criticizing Izetbegović here one cannot also avoid mentioning again the
increasingly nationalistic atmosphere that was growing outside of Bosnia, something he could not
ignore as a politician who needed to be attuned to public opinion. Indeed, it was probably
impossible for even relatively well-meaning leaders like Izetbegović, much less a Karadžić, not
to indulge in some kind of ethnic nationalist rhetoric considering how things were at around this
same time breaking down to the west in Croatia. Reacting in many ways disproportionately to
the new Croatian constitution created around the end of June, which now stated that there was
only a Croatian nation – versus the previous Communist constitution, which said that Croatia was
‘the national state of the Croatian nation and the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia’ – Croatian
Serbs, especially those in more rural areas, became increasing angered and frightened by what
they saw as the hard-line nationalism of a new Ustaše government in Zagreb (as Milošević’s
Politika and Politika Express, where most Croatian Serbs actually got their news from, described
Tuñman’s administration). Confrontation between Croats and the Croatian Serbs ensued,
especially in the Croatian towns of Knin and Benkovac, which the Croatian Serbs mostly won
because they had been given military supplies by the increasingly Serb-dominated JNA and
because the Croats had been mostly disarmed by the JNA shortly before the April elections (as
had the Bosnians and the peoples in all the other Yugoslav republics, with the exception of the
Slovenes who had managed to hold on to a good share of their weaponry). Emboldened by these
wins, on 25 August the SDS leader in Croatia Milan Babić declared that the creation of the
Autonomous Province of the Serbian Krajina had occurred, based on the results of a referendum
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in which 100% of the region’s Serbs had approved of this new mini-state (Croats, unsurprisingly,
were not allowed to vote in this referendum).105
Undoubtedly the violence in Croatia made its impact felt in Bosnia, with the Bosnians
becoming increasingly agitated because of it. There were some violent episodes, as when a bus
was stoned in the town of Livno because it was from Belgrade, but the major problem was just
ethnic tensions starting to reach a higher pitch in many Bosnian areas during the summer and
autumn. Politicians were saying outrageous things like “Five years will not pass, and our
[Croatian] flag will be flying on top of Mount Romanija….. Bosnia is Croatian from ancient
times” and people in villages wanted to join the areas where their ethnicity was in the majority. It
is important to emphasize though that there were also incidents involving Bosnians who wanted
to voice their displeasure against the mindless nationalism going on. In June of 1990, for
instance, after Yugoslavia beat Spain in football Bosnians spontaneously took to the streets of
Sarajevo and waved Yugoslav flags all night, stopping traffic to demonstrate their adherence to a
multi-ethnic Bosnia. Yet even during this peaceful night violence occurred, with the car driving
the mayor of Zagreb being attacked. The media, to a certain extent, started to also get into the
act, with newspaper writers and radio speakers often decrying the nationalists.106 Members of the
nationalist parties started to worry that things were getting out of hand and that they would face a
backlash, with the voters going for non-nationalist parties like Marković’s, so they met on 4
November just before the election and agreed to cut out the nationalistic rhetoric. They all spoke
of the need to have a civil republic, with Karadžić, for example, saying that a civil war was a
“mad and impossible idea…. We can live together; living together has created some eternal
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values and the possibilities of continuing to live together.”107 Hence there was what in retrospect
must be seen as the rather strange phenomenon of right before the elections Karadžić telling his
supporters at Pale outside of Sarajevo to remember the centuries of good relations between the
Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, as well as members of the SDA and the SDS appearing together in
Sarajevo and talking about how they as Serbs and Muslims had always been good neighbors.108
It would seem that the three parties’ strategy of reconciling at the last minute worked out
brilliantly, with Bosnian voters feeling secure enough to vote for them in spite of the ethnic
exclusivism they had espoused for most of the 1990 campaign (although they certainly still had
their misgivings). When the Bosnians voted in November 1990 they came out in overwhelming
support for nationalist parties – Serbs for the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party), Croats for the
HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), and Muslims for the SDA, with parties like Zulfikarpašić’s
MBO or the reformed Communists (pre-election polls had suggested that this later party would
come out on top) doing very poorly. Suad Arrnautović, who surveyed a great deal of pre-election
data, argues that many Bosnian voters supported various candidates and parties out of fear, not so
much voting for Izetbegović and the SDA as against Karadžić and the SDS, and vice-versa.
Armautović also argues that even though these voters were originally inclined to vote for the nonnationalist parties, as the elections approached they felt compelled to cast in their lot with the
nationalists. Or consider the remarks of Ljiljana Smajlović, who until the Bosnian War was a
journalist for the Sarajevo newspaper Oslobodjenje: “[Serbs] simply acted out of fear that even if
they withheld their vote from a Karadžić, their Muslim neighbor would still give his vote to an
Izetbegović. In the end, they were afraid of weakening their own nation in an hour presaging the
ultimate confrontation.” This all suggests that under a more normal atmosphere outside and
inside of Bosnia the more universalistic parties like the Reform party would have done better –
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yet another example of how individuals like Milošević and Tuñman (as well as Izetbegović and
Karadžić) had helped to create the stressful situation Bosnia was in, and how it just did not
simply originate out of submerged passions from the past. Muslims in particular but also some
Serbs and Croats also preferred Izetbegović’s strong support of the interests of Bosnia, versus
somebody like Zulfikarpašić, who was more idealistic about Yugoslavism and was more willing
to work with Belgrade. As Izetbegović had put it in a September 1990 rally, “…Bosnia will not
tolerate staying in a greater Serbia and being part of it. If it comes to that, we will declare
independence…” Or as Steven Burg and Paul Shoup put the matter, “The rise of extreme
nationalism in Serb nationalism in Serbia, and especially the repression of the Albanian minority
in Kosovo, had made the prospect of remaining part of a Yugoslav state that did not contain
Slovenia and Croatia, and thereby constituted little more than a greater Serbia, intolerable for the
Muslim nationalistic leadership.”109 Finally, many imams, especially those from the rural areas,
had been highly supportive of the SDA and helped the party get votes.110 They had been at all the
mass meetings during the campaign, and if just before the election they did not exactly tell their
flocks who to vote for, by simply offering a description of the SDA they were able to send the
message. By being so involved in the campaign they were simply copying their Orthodox and
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Catholic counterparts, priests who in essence sent the same sort of message to their own flocks on
who to vote for – basically the SDS and HDZ.111
Although Fikret Abdić actually garnered the most votes in the election for the presidency,
some back-room deal occurred and Izetbegović – who had come in second – became president of
Bosnia.112 With his assumption of this position, Izetbegović faced the terribly challenging job of
governing in a republic that was becoming increasingly divided; the virus of nationalism that had
traveled through the different Yugoslav republics over the years had infiltrated Bosnia now as
well. Yet there still was a sense of hope in the air, with the feeling being that in spite of all that
had happened over the past year in Bosnia and the other republics, reconciliation between the
different ethnic parties and groups might ultimately occur. Right after the election Izetbegović,
Karadžić, and other political leaders of all religions and ethnicities gathered at the Evropa Hotel,
celebrating each other’s holidays “with brotherly enthusiasm” and giving off an “Andrić-like
appearance” in the words of one observer.113 Perhaps peace really would have a chance.
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Chapter Three
Izetbegović’s Dangerous Gamble

Of course, it did not happen that way – this residue of good will quickly broke down and
seventeen months later Bosnia was embroiled in a bitter war. For those scholars who have been
sympathetic to Izetbegović (or at least the Bosnian cause) the narrative they give for explaining
these next seventeen months is this. As the Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia - chafing
under the authoritarianism of Milošević - increasingly signaled their intentions of becoming
independent states, Bosnian Muslims and Croats (and not a few Bosnian Serbs, for that matter)
were greatly afraid of the oppression they would face being under the thumb of a Serbiandominated Yugoslavia without the Croats or Slovenes to act as buffer peoples. Hence there
would be the need for there to be an independent Bosnia if the Croats and Slovenes seceded from
Yugoslavia, although for the time being Izetbegović could try to press for greater Bosnian
sovereignty. Unfortunately Belgrade and some Serbs within Bosnia would not be able to accept
this. Indeed, Milošević and others had long since been reconciled to the need to create a living
space for Serbs even before the end of the Cold War, having created the so-called RAM plan
which laid out in precise detail the carving up of different parts of Bosnia and Croatia that would
become a part of a “Greater Serbia.” Thus commenced the RAM plan in the beginning of 1990
right after the Bosnian elections, with the secret arming of Bosnian Serbs by Belgrade114 and the
beginning of wave after wave of propaganda by the Serbian media, accusing the Bosnian
Muslims of being Islamic terrorists and the like.
With the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence and the beginning of the
war in Croatia and Slovenia in June of 1991, it is likely that Izetbegović started to realize that the
preservation of a democratic Yugoslavia might not be possible. Add to this the discovery that the
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Bosnian Serbs had secretly been armed by Belgrade, the creation of Serbian Autonomous Oblasts
(SAOs) throughout Bosnia during the autumn (in essence Serbian dominated areas which refused
to recognize the central government in Sarajevo), Radovan Karadžić’s terrible words during the
14 October 1991 parliament session in which he asked if the Bosnians wanted to go down the
same “highway to hell” that the Slovenians and Croats were going down by their pushing for
sovereignty (and implicitly independence), and most importantly the recognition by the European
Community of Croatia and Slovenia as independent states, and Izetbegović realized that things
had degenerated in Bosnia to such a degree that sovereignty would not do and Bosnia would have
to totally declare her independence from Yugoslavia.
With the backing of the international community in 1992 then, the Bosnian parliament
came out with a referendum in which the people of Bosnia would decide whether they would
support an independent Bosnia. Voting on the referendum 29 February/ 1March 1992, the
Bosnian people by a clear majority decided on Bosnian independence. Unwilling to accept this
declaration of the Bosnian people’s will acting in a democratic fashion, the Bosnian Serbs (with
the backing of their sponsors in Belgrade and with the support of the Serbian dominated JNA)
began a brutal war against the Bosnian Croats and Muslims that the latter were totally unprepared
for and did not expect would happen, driving entire populations out of their homes through a
combination of murder, rapes, and terror, making the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ known throughout
the world.115
This portrayal of the run-up to the 1992 Bosnian war, which is probably the version that
is most familiar to the general audience, contains a good deal of truth, although as we shall also
see things were a good deal more complicated than that. We should start off by considering the
very important issue of whether the Izetbegović government was really caught off guard by the
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advent of war in April of 1992. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the evidence suggests it
was not. Far from “suffering from terminal naivety,” about the chaos that was all around him as
Sabrina Ramet put it,116 Izetbegović and his cohorts probably knew exactly what would happen if
Bosnia were to declare its independence: there would be war. We know this now because of the
research of the political scientist Alan J. Kuperman, who interviewed Izetbegović as well as all of
the important officials within the Bosnian government at the time, almost all of whom admitted
that they were well aware that if Bosnia seceded, then the Serbs would initiate war117 – and not
merely a conventional war either, but as could be seen from the war the JNA had already started
with the Croats and had demonstrated most vividly at the battle for the Croatian city of Vukovar,
one which would be forged mercilessly against innocent civilians.118
To be sure, the image that Izetbegović wanted to present to the Bosnian public was
precisely one of there not being an approaching war, which was probably no accident but part of a
strategy. In speech after speech he gave, Izetbegović endlessly dwelled on certain themes that he
repeated ad infinitum like some kind of mantra – there cannot be war because it would be
suicidal, it takes two to make war, and so on, saying for example in December 1991 that he did
not think the JNA would attack Bosnia, or in mid-March of 1992 - about three weeks before the
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war - “[t]here will be no war in Bosnia, [neither] local nor imported.” Considering that things
had broken down within Bosnia by the time he made these remarks and the surreal disjunction
that now existed between Izetbegović’s words and reality – many firms at this point were paying
taxes not to the Sarajevo government but to different ethnic political parties and approximately 1
out of 10 Bosnians were armed119 - it may seem incredible that he was not laughed off the stage.
Yet amazingly much of the Bosnian public bought Izetbegović’s performance. Or perhaps not so
amazingly, since by telling the people that there would not be war he was telling the people
simply what they wanted to hear, or repeating out loud what they were telling themselves.120
Izetbegović was playing their music, striking all the chords within the psyches of Bosnians especially those from the cities, many of whom had grown up during the formative years of the
golden age of Yugoslavia, the late 1960s and 1970s, the period of socialist prosperity when
Bosnians went to the Dalmatian beaches during the summers, spent lazy evenings in cafes
smoking and drinking Turkish coffee with Serbian, Croatian, or Muslim cohorts, and where they
went to Christmas services even if they were Muslims or to a mosque even if they were
Christians. For so long they had lived together peacefully, and even with war staring them in the
face they could not believe that at five minutes to midnight they would be not be able to just sit
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down, have another cup of coffee, and find some way out.121 What could be better then for the
Bosnian population who were coming up with every rationalization in the world for how war
might somehow not come, than a leader who was echoing in public these very same
rationalizations?
Much of the Bosnian public may have believed – or wanted to have believed – what their
president said; Izetbegović himself probably did not. Yet even though Izetbegović may not have
believed the very his own words, he certainly hoped his audiences believed him. And the most
important audience Izetbegović probably had in mind was not his own people, but rather the
international community. For Izetbegović was playing a very dangerous game here, proclaiming
that Bosnia was totally dedicated to peace and would never go to war while at the same time
hoping that when the war actually came – which again probably he knew would come in spite of
what he was saying publicly – the international community would be so shocked by the
aggression imposed by the Serbs on the Bosnians and be so aware of the helplessness of the
Bosnian position that they would feel compelled to intervene on the Bosnians’ behalf. In order to
be seen simply as the victim in this war though, not only would Bosnia have to be seen as totally
pacific before the conflict,122 but once the war started they would have to be seen as totally losing
the military campaign, since if there was some parity in the war then there was the danger that the
international community would simply see the conflict as just another civil war, rather than as a
war of aggression on the part of the Serbs against the Bosnians. The upside to this strategy, of
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course, was even though the Bosnians would have to fight for a while and pay the terrible price of
many military and civilian casualties, it would be worth it in the long run because then the
sympathetic international community would come to their rescue.123
Although this account of the Bosnians’ strategy of getting the international community to
side with them in the case of war cannot be proven as substantially (I think) as the case of the
Bosnians’ expecting there to be conflict when they declared independence, and as we shall see
later in the conclusion of this essay that there are some real problems with it, there is still a lot of
evidence to recommend it. Again, a lot of Kuperman’s evidence comes from interviews.124 As
Izetbegović himself admitted, “Our tactics were to buy time…[we pursued] a zigzag line for
independence… so the international community would defend this country.” Or consider the
words of the foreign minister at the time, Haris Silajdžić, “My strategy was to get Bosnia
independent so that it would be granted rights by the international community” – rights that he
hoped would be defended by the use of force on the part of the European and/or Americans.125
Silajdžić and another SDA member Ejup Ganić also told Adil Zulfikarpašić in the summer of
1991 that if Bosnia were able to receive U.N. recognition then the Muslims would “receive
protection” and Muhamed Cengic, the SDA Vice-President said to Kuperman, “We thought
Europe or the United Nations would do anything in their power to stop or prevent war.”126
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How much of a foundation was there for their hope though, that when the arms clashed
the U.S. and Europe would be there at the breach? Certainly as far as the American response was
concerned, next to none, at least until a few months before the war when the American response
might have seemed as being more sympathetic. Although so many works have been penned
analyzing the different currents running through the American government in their response to
the impending Balkan crisis and as difficult as it is to wade through them all, it is nonetheless
fairly easy to find a good deal of consensus about what the basic American attitude was at the
time, at least as far as the Bush administration was concerned. Basically, their response was very
much a muddied one in which they preached the preservation of Yugoslavia on one hand, with
respect for democracy on the other, unaware as they were that these two goals were irreconcilable
and made little sense as a practical policy for what was really happening in Yugoslavia.127 And if
the Bush’s administrations policy for Yugoslavia was cryptic then the means for backing up
whatever that policy was were non-existent, with their giving no assurance whatsoever that they
would intervene in Yugoslav affairs or enforce any sort of agreement with military might. As one
astute observer rightly saw the tough-sounding talk the Secretary of State James Baker gave to
Slobodan Milošević and others during his famous 21 June 1991 meeting with the Yugoslav
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leaders, Baker did not give a green light to Milošević to invade the republics but he did not give a
red light either, since there was not “a single member of Congress…. [who] advocated the
introduction of American military power.”128 Not surprisingly Milošević saw the lack of a red
light as a green one and believed the Americans were going to do nothing militarily then to
protect Bosnia or any other Yugoslav nation.
But what about the hope for a European response? It is easy to mock now Jacques Poos’
infamous statement, “The age of Europe has dawned,” and other remarks he made that suggested
the Americans were not needed any more and the Europeans could take care of things now, thank
you very much, but during the early 1990s there was, after all, a renewed confidence within
European nations that they could now handle the problems in their own sphere of influence
without running this time to the Americans for help. The Cold War had just ended, ending the
terrifying prospect of a nuclear war; the Russians were leaving Eastern Europe peacefully and
fairly expeditiously; the two Germanys were headed towards unification in a seemingly benign
fashion – all of this serendipitous good fortune seemed to herald an approaching golden age of
European strength and unity. Since there was no longer the need to worry about the Soviets, the
thinking went, Europeans could now devote more of her energies to solving problems like the
Yugoslav cauldron. The prosperous western European nations, then, would show the different
Yugoslav states that it made no economic and politic sense in this modern era to war over petty
ethnic differences, that such problems could be dealt with intelligently and with compromise, and
that if the Yugoslav states were willing to sensibly work out their disagreements then they too
could eventually be a part of the wealthy European community. And to be fair, such a response
might have succeeded if the Yugoslav states had been led by moderate, reforming leaders. But of
course they were not, and were instead led by nationalists like Milošević and Tuñman who would
not be stopped through peaceful coercion or economic carrots – they only could be stopped by
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force.129 Alas, this was the one chink in the European arsenal, the one alternative that they were
unwilling to resort to.130
That this all should have been very apparent to Izetbegović rather quickly can be seen in
the European response to the war in Croatia in 1991 which, to put it most charitably, left a lot to
be desired. As Gregory F. Treverton, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, noted
at around this time, the European Community (EC) was able to do a few things to help – they
were able to send some foreign ministers to monitor the conflict, they were able to apply
sanctions against Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia) in November of 1991 (although rather belatedly), they
were able to broker a ceasefire (actually he – it was the U.N. envoy and American Cyrus Vance
who was able to get the deal), and they were able to then deploy 10,000 peacekeeping troops.
Yet as he also pointed out the European response was in many ways ineffective, with divisions
between the Serbophile French and British and Croatophile French, an inability to act on the idea
of sending 30,000 European troops to settle the conflict, the collapse of approximately a dozen
ceasefires during the war, and Vance’s ceasefire succeeding only because the Serbian-dominated
JNA was beginning to lose the war and thus willing to stop its offensive.131 On the minus side of
all of this one must also add that Milošević had pretty much conquered the areas that he wanted in
Croatia and was able to quit while he was ahead. Considering the fact that there was no EC
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mechanism forcing Milošević to forgo his conquests – Serbian “police” were allowed to maintain
order there – it was all a very sweet deal for him, and this precedent of military lack of teeth on
the part of the EC should have made Izetbegović and his cohorts rather skeptical about the
Europeans being able to save their skins.
Something that should have made Izetbegović even more skeptical is that when he asked
for peacekeepers on 21 November 1991, both the Americans and Europeans were unwilling to
provide them for him at this time.132 Or consider the middle of March 1992, right before the war
started, when Haris Silajdžić came to talk to an official of the National Security Council to ask among other things - for American military support – the official had to sadly tell him no.133 This
lack of help should not have been surprising to Izetbegović; he had personally met with American
officials in Washington in 1991, and although he had found Senator Bob Dole sympathetic to his
dilemma he felt ”the Bush administration had no understanding of the Yugoslav crisis.”134 It was
for these sort of reasons undoubtedly that when asked by Adil Zulfikarpašić in July of 1991
whether Izetbegović had received any offers of foreign support, Izetbegović had to admit that he
had not.135
To be fair though to Izetbegović and most of the top Bosnian officials, they were thinking
that even if the international community might not promise to get involved before the war, once
132

It is important to note that the American ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmerman, who probably
was the most sympathetic high-ranking official to the needs of the Bosnians at the time, admitted that he
did not press as hard as he should have for the peacekeepers – yet another example of a bureaucrat who did
not want to do battle against the forces of inertia. This in spite of the fact that he liked Izetbegović and
thought the leader was doing everything he could to promote peace. As Zimmerman writes, “I noted
during the conversation [in late October 1991] the moderate nature of Izetbegović’s views and his charity
to people – Tuñman, the JNA leadership, the Bosnian Serbs – who were reviling him in the most scabrous
way.” Also significant is Zimmerman’s observation that the only person Izetbegović seemed to trust in the
government was his own daughter Sabina, who was always a ubiquitous presence in his office answering
the phone and greeting visitors. Apparently Izetbegović had no Harry Hopkins-type figure he could rely on
for help and guidance through the heavy thickets of Balkan politics. Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a
Catastrophe, 172-174.
133
Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S.
Policy in Europe, 1989-1992 (Washington D.C. and Baltimore: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 315.
134
Alija Izetbegović, Inescapable Questions : Autobiographical Notes, trans. Saba Rissaluddin and Jasmina
Izetbegović (Leichester, England: The Islamic Foundation, 2003), 89, 94.
135
Kuperman, “Tragic Challenges,” 125.

63

the war actually started and Europe and America became horrified at the carnage that the Serbs
were causing, then they would intervene and stop the madness. Considering the fact though that
the Europeans would only send a few thousand basically useless (and at times worse than useless)
U.N. peacekeepers over the next three and a half years and that American troops would not be in
Bosnia until after the war was actually over (although of course the American-led NATO did
bomb the Serbs sporadically in 1994 and quite intensely in 1995), it is easy to say in retrospect
that this hope was obviously severely misguided. Yet it was this policy that they decided to go
with and which determined the moves that the Izetbegović government made not only before but
also during the war as well, right up to the Dayton Accords in November of 1995. Indeed, a
major downside of this policy was that it in effect made Izetbegović stuck in a way that limited
his options and forced him into a corner which made it impossible for him to consider certain
choices over the years that might have been better for Bosnia.
To get back now to the time period right after the 1990 elections where we left off, it
should be said that in one sense at least Izetbegović was willing to be flexible, insofar as he was
determined to provide at least some military strength for his nation through his own resources –
hence the development of the Patriotic League as early as December of 1990 and the first few
months of 1991, a military force which was beholden to the SDA party and not to the general,
coalition Bosnian government.136 Izetbegović and his close advisors had decided upon this action
almost right after the recent elections when the actions of the three major ethnic political parties
showed how brittle their coalition of convenience really was. Unlike during the end of the
campaign when the three political parties were able to be lovey-dovey with each other, when they
actually had to govern they were almost immediately at each others’ throats. Perhaps the
passions unleashed over the last year inside and outside Bosnia had just been too much for the
nationalist leaders and their parties, and once in power the only people they felt they could trust
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were their own ethnic kin. This could be very easily seen right after the elections had barely been
concluded when the SDA, HDZ, and SDS respectively all performed purges of the various local
governments in Bosnia where they were each dominant, something that Izetbegović for his part
apparently did nothing to stop. In Sarajevo, for example, the Muslim-dominated SDA managed to
dominate the central Bosnian government, undoubtedly stoking Serbian and Croatian fears of
Muslim dominance at least as far as Bosnia as a state was concerned. So much then for the
democratic ideals Izetbegović had earlier expressed at the Sarajevo Holiday Inn – they were to be
replaced by an authoritarianism that tended to disregard public opinion and was often insensitive
to the rights and fears of the different ethnic groups and those with different political sympathies.
One suspects that even at this early point Izetbegović personally felt that some sort of
accommodation with the Serbs would be remarkably difficult to achieve, and that in spite of
whatever noble efforts he might attempt conflict was in many ways inevitable and therefore there
was a need to arm secretly.
And so it went – for the next fifteen months until the advent of the war the situation in
Bosnia remained bleak, and although the two major players during all of this – Izetbegović and
Karadžić (and behind this latter figure, his patron Milošević in Belgrade, as well as to a certain
extent the Bosnian Croat leadership and their patron in Zagreb, Tuñman) – did in some ways try
to alleviate the stress and find some way out of the impasse, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
their positions were mostly set and that there was little that could have been done to avoid war in
1992. For in essence the matter was really fairly simple – at the end of the day Izetbegović was
not willing to do anything that would put Bosnia under Serbian control or that would compromise
Bosnia’s territorial integrity, and Karadžić was never willing to accept a situation in which the
Serbs within Bosnia would be in a minority. It was a circle that just could not be squared. What
is critical then is to try to empathize with the situations they felt they were in and the limitations
they faced, assess them honestly, and determine whether there were really no ways out for either
one of them. By doing this we can hopefully answer the important question which obviously
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continues to divide many people – Who was really responsible for the outbreak of war and who
should the onus really be applied to? To determine this, it is necessary to critically evaluate the
statesmanship and character not only of Izetbegović, the subject of this thesis, but also to an
extent that of Karadžić, since the actions of one were highly contingent on the actions of the other
during this critical time. In order to understand Izetbegović, we also have to understand
Karadžić.
One very important issue to consider is whether Izetbegović should have done more to
create a government that had more checks-and-balances and would seem much more secure for
the Serbs. Basically he subscribed to the one-man, one-vote principle, that government should be
based on the majority and that no reference to ethnicity should be made. The problem with this,
of course, was that two ethnic groups like the Muslims and Croats could always form a coalition
that would enable them to outvote the Serbs, for instance on an issue like the independence of
Bosnia over which they would strongly disagree. This went against the sort of maneuvering
which occurred during the Titoist era, when the Communists worked hard at achieving a kind of
consensus in which one group did not get out of line and all groups felt protected.
Izetbegović could have provided some reassurement to the Serbs then by creating some
government mechanism which would give more veto power to the Serbs, but there is no
indication that such an effort was even attempted. Much attention has been given to Karadžić’s
“highway to hell” speech in October of 1991, but perhaps the even more significant event
occurred after the Serbian delegation had walked out of the Bosnian parliament and the remaining
Croat/Muslim members voted on the sovereignty of Bosnia through the so-called
“Memorandum.” Although this memorandum paid some lip service to affirming the rights of
minority groups, it provided no real mechanism to act as a brake on any potential tyranny of the
majority. In other words, Croats and Muslims could in theory simply form coalitions and outvote the lesser represented Serbs on any issue, something that certainly had a precedent in earlier
times (e.g. under the Habsburgs, when Croats and Muslims and a few Serbs were able to block
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meaningful land reform which would have benefited the Serb peasants). There had been the
creation of a “Council for National Equality,” in July of 1990 that might have been given some
teeth to act as a brake on legislative control, and there was also some consideration concerning
the creation of two houses of parliament, one national and one regional (something supported by
the more moderate Serb Nenad Kecmanović, since he felt that Bosnia was not ready for a true
civil society and real democratic governance, and that much power needed to be given to certain
Bosnian regions where Serbs would be able to have a greater say), but the Muslims and Croats
decided not to adopt these.137
Yet in criticizing Izetbegović for this, one has to also consider the problem of Karadžić
and whether he would have used his veto power in a prudent and conscientious manner, or if at
this point he was too much a creature of radical nationalism and of Milošević and would have
used the veto to simply repudiate any decision he and his fellow Serbs did not like. The evidence
seems to mostly support the latter. Even before the 1990 elections Karadžić had shown that he
was totally unwilling to accept any situation that left Bosnian Serbs in the minority,
notwithstanding any goodwill that the rest of Bosnia might promise. This can be seen in the
decision at this time to create an ‘An All Serb Assembly’ in the important Bosnian city of Banja
Luka and other Bosnian cities where a significant number of Serbs resided and which was seen a
clear threat to the Bosnians to not support the establishment of an independent Bosnian state.138
In defense of this uncompromising stance Karadžić was often bullying and bellicose, in his
“highway to hell” speech of course but also in other utterances he gave as well. Zimmerman, for
instance, notes often in his memoir Karadžić’s lack of perspective and moderation, how the latter
would call Croats “fascists” and Muslims “Islamist fanatics,” or would argue that since the Serbs
were more rural they were entitled to a much larger share of Bosnian territory, and so forth.139
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Still, part of being a statesman is knowing when to deal, even with other leaders who are
rather unattractive – like Karadžić. This brings us to the question of whether Izetbegović should
have compromised and agreed to one of the two important peace proposals that came to him and
which, theoretically at least, could have averted war. The first of these was the so-called Belgrade
Initiative that came about in July of 1991, which basically involved Bosnia remaining in a rump
Yugoslavia without Croatia or Slovenia, and in exchange Belgrade would not support any SAOs
in Bosnia and would respect Bosnia’s sovereignty. Izetbegović, probably more aware of the
dangers and risks of declaring independence than he allowed publicly or to certain hard line
members of his party by this time, at first accepted the agreement but then repudiated it after
hardliners in his party apparently protested that Bosnia would simply continue to be a victim of
Milošević’s aggression by staying within Yugoslavia.140 Critics of various persuasions have ever
since condemned Izetbegović for his decision, seeing in it his rejection of the only possibility at
that point for avoiding a dreadful war that he himself knew the Bosnians were not prepared for.
Adil Zulfikarpašić, who was one of the originators of the plan, is one of the harshest, arguing that
not only would his plan have averted war but it would have also have provided for “Bosnia’s
independence” and the Muslims’ being recognized as an “ethnic group, as a nation.” Milovan
ðilas concurs with this and believes the plan was premised on the idea that the Serbs and
Muslims would always be on equal footing in a rump Yugoslavia.141 Kuperman quotes
approvingly Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, two of the most detached scholars of the Bosnian
conflict, who argue that this plan might have been a good one for the Bosnians to have agreed to
since it would have headed off war and Bosnia most likely would have been able to retain many
of her rights as a republic in a rump Yugoslavia.142
Yet as Burg and Shoup also argue (and as Kuperman fails to mention that they also
argue), it is doubtful that the Serbs themselves would ultimately have agreed to this plan, or at
140

Kuperman, “Tragic Challenges,” 126-127.
Adil Zulfikarpašić, The Bosniak (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1998), 164-165.
142
Kuperman, “Tragic Challenges,” 146.
141

68

least Zulfikarpašić’s version of it since it called for such things as the uniting of the Sandžak
region of Serbia – a region with a large number of Muslims – with Bosnia, and gave the Bosnians
more power than Milošević would have been comfortable with.143 But a more fundamental
objection is that the Zulfikarpašić proposal was rather naively premised on the idea that Milošević
was a sensible, pragmatic statesman who in spite of all he had done would now suddenly reform
and become a great respecter of Muslim rights. Those who think that Bosnians should have given
peace a chance and had such a faith in a new Milošević have to ignore a lot of things he did
during the late 1980 and early 1990s. And even if it is true that Milošević was ultimately an
opportunistic politician who would as easily switch to peace as commit to war, no sensible person
had any illusions that given a pretext or opportunity Milošević could just as easily go back on his
promises and become tyrannical again.
Yet even if armchair historians are willing to give Milošević and the Bosnian Serbs the
benefit of the doubt, the point is ultimately moot, for all of the evidence seems to demonstrate
that the Bosnians themselves were not. In the end the Belgrade Initiative probably could not have
happened if for no other reason than that all those who were not Serbs would never have allowed
it. We have already seen that one of the reasons Bosnians favored Izetbegović over Zulfikarpašić
was because the latter was seen as too accommodating to the interests of Belgrade, and there is
little reason to believe that the mentalities of Bosnians had changed a year later as far as this issue
was concerned. Even Kuperman quotes an important Bosnian official who admitted that
“average Bosnians” saw officials like Zulfikarpašić as weak “quislings…. of the [Milošević]
regime” for their proposal of such a plan.144
Still, it is always possible that Milošević would have been magnanimous in victory and
realized that the eyes of the international community would be on him, thus doing all he could to
treat a Bosnian republic in Yugoslavia with generosity and respect. Another indictment to make
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of Izetbegović then is that in his rejection of the Belgrade Initiative he - as a democratic
representative of the people, had an obligation then to present to the Bosnian public the harsh
reality of what his rejection would mean - which is that the price of not remaining in Yugoslavia
would almost certainly be war. Or to go even further, perhaps he should have put it on the
shoulders of the Bosnians to decide whether they wanted to remain in a rump Yugoslavia and
take their chances on a reformed Milošević. To put the matter another way, it was the Bosnians like the people of any democratic society - and not Izetbegović and his cronies who had the right
to decide whether they wanted either an unjust peace or justice at a terrible price, and Izetbegović
was wrong in denying them this choice. The problem with this though is that if Izetbegović had
asked the people to decide on this issue through a referendum or what-not and they voted to
refuse the Belgrade Initiative, then Karadžić and Milošević could have seized upon this
repudiation as evidence that the Bosnian people were uninterested in peace and could care less
about the rights of the Serbian people. Hence when the Serbs initiated war it could be more
easily justified as not a war of aggression but simply a military action designed to protect the
Serbs, something the international community might have been willing to accept. Another
problem is a more obvious one, namely the difficulty Izetbegović would have had in trying to
explain to the Bosnian people why they had to tolerate living under a Milošević regime. No
democratic politician likes to admit failure, and Izetbegović was understandably no exception to
this general rule.
The second peace plan (or plans, to be more precise, since different versions of the plan
were proposed over a number of months from February 14 to July 28 1992) was the Cutileiro
Negotiations, led by the EC mediator Jose Cutileiro, which called for a united Bosnia with
national regions. Kuperman argues that even before these negotiations Karadžić and other Serb
leaders had offered Izetbegović such a cantonization plan, in which the different ethnic groups
would have had control over the cantons in which their group was in the majority, and these
cantons would be non-contiguous so their plan could not be seen as supporting the partition of
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Bosnia. Izetbegović and other Bosnian Muslim leaders were initially supportive of it and it was
thought that peace was at hand, but then yet again hard-liners within Izetbegović’s party
pressured him into doing an about-face and he ended up rejecting this plan. Later during the
Cutileiro Negotiations other cantonization plans were offered, significantly the March 18 one
which would have given Muslims the same amount of territory as Serbs and far fewer Muslims
would have lived in cantons as minorities than Serbs or Croats. During these negotiations
Izetbegović demonstrated his typical flexibility of conviction, first agreeing to a cantonization
plan because of heavy pressure from Cutileiro - who threatened to withdraw recognition of
Bosnia if Izetbegović did not agree to it – then repudiating it when he later got slammed by party
members in Sarajevo. Later Izetbegović would agree to the March 18 cantonization plan, then
repudiate it about a week later, and then at the end of March agree to the principle of
cantonization once again, with his flip-flops being based on fear of losing international
recognition of Bosnia if Europe and the Americans thought he was not doing his part to promote
a peaceful solution by supporting cantonization. Again, Kuperman argues, peace could have been
had but Izetbegović and the hard-liners in the SDA blew it.145
Yet Kuperman ignores some good reasons for why Izetbegović and others would be
unsatisfied with these various proposals. Concerning the original plan before the Cuteilo
Negotiations that Karadžić and others were so wild about, for instance, it assigned an
overwhelming amount of the territory of Bosnia to the Serbs even though their population was
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smaller than the Muslims, and if it was not a partition per se then it was certainly partition-lite
with the Bosnian Serb held areas being easily accessible to Serbia – these things would have
certainly been difficult for Izetbegović to explain to his people (and was perhaps one of the
reasons why the hardliners in Izetbegović’s party told him to reject it).146 And as far as all of
these plans were concerned, none of them provided any real enforcement mechanism for
guaranteeing Bosnian’s territorial integrity and helping to assure that the Serbs on the east and the
Croats on the West would not be able to assert their reach into cantons that were theoretically
Bosnian but in a real de facto sense simply parts of a greater Croatia or Serbia. Under the 18
March cantonization plan, for instance, there was no sense of whether there would only be a
federal army or if all the regions would have their own army, and each national region would
have been able to have foreign relations with other states as long as the maintenance of Bosnia
was maintained – a sure recipe for endless disputes between the different ethnic groups. It was
not for nothing that Karadžić asserted that the March 18 plan created three different Bosnias. So
the Bosnians were not just throwing away a chance for peace because they wanted to have total
control over Bosnia without any sort of regional autonomy – they could rightly argue that all of
these peace plans simply provided a slippery slope to a partitioned Bosnia in all but name.147
In rejecting what they regarded as unjust peace plans though, were Izetbegović and other
Bosnian officials doing something just as bad through their affirmation of a united Bosnia in
which the Muslims would be in the majority and in which they would be seen as a threat to the
Christians living there? To be sure, in at least some ways the Izetbegović led government was
just as corrupt and illiberal as were their non-Muslim counterparts. Yet to say that Izetbegović
was simply just as bad as, say, Karadžić seems to miss some important distinctions between their
movements and what they represented. In evaluating Karadžić and his SDS, and to an extent the
Croatian HDZ, it is rather difficult to see them as being anything other than fundamentally crude
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and belligerent in the methods they used to advance their agendas. Before the war there is no
evidence that Izetbegović advocated a policy in which Muslims violently threatened other
Muslims who seemed to be too friendly to the Serbs, a phenomenon that was quite common with
the Bosnian Serbs during this time. Izetbegović never gave a public interview like the one
Tuñman did, when in July of 1991 the latter quite frankly admitted without any sense of guilt
that he and Milošević had wanted to divide up Bosnia. Or consider a stunt most likely performed
by the JNA, who leaked a story to the 21 November 1991 issue of the tabloid Slobodna Bosna,
which said that SDS paramilitaries were getting ready to attack Sarajevo and that the JNA was
helping them – this sort of thing was clearly designed to frighten and intimidate the Bosnians.148
There was also something rather dispiriting about the nationalisms of Karadžić or
somebody like the Croat leader Mate Boban – whose strings were pulled by Tuñman – that
contrasted greatly with the liberalism of the many Serbs, Croats, and Muslims who believed in a
multi-ethnic, democratic Bosnia. On the one hand there were the Croats like the Franciscans, an
order which went back to the Middle Ages when they first started to evangelize those uncouth
Slavs, who nobly advocated a united Bosnia where all ethnicities would be able to live together
peacefully. On the other hand there was the Croat Tuñman, who had simple contempt for the
Bosnian Muslims, seeing them just as Islamized Croats who had no right to land that properly
should just be annexed to Croatia. There was a tradition then of being Bosnian, that was upheld
by all the ethnic groups who saw no contradiction between being a Serb and belonging to the
Bosnian nation, and which at the same time was also sadly denied by nationalists like Karadžić
who saw no sort of compatibility between the two. The fact that this tradition had perhaps not yet
had the time or ability to have made Bosnia a true nation at this point in time does not mean that
this idea of Bosnia did not exist, or that because some Bosnians too naively overemphasized the
cosmopolitanism of Bosnia that this meant that such cosmopolitanism was untrue. The idea of
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Bosnia did exist, and its cosmopolitanism was true, and even if Izetbegović’s advocacy of these
values was less than might be desired, his performance was still better than Karadžić’s or those of
other nationalist leaders.
Yet even if Izetbegović’s behavior was in many ways more noble and not nearly as
extreme as others before the war, was it still not in many ways rather poor? Did he not fail to live
up to his responsibilities as a leader who had to be acutely sensitive to the feelings and sentiments
of other ethnicities in a multi-ethnic nation that had had more than its fair share of inter-ethnic
violence in the past? To an extent, yes, but one must also acknowledge the limitations he faced
and the difficult circumstances of the time. Consider Izetbegović’s efforts to publicly curry favor
with influential Islamic nations abroad, which not unnaturally reinforced the suspicion that in
spite of whatever liberal pieties he might espouse in public to show that he was a great democrat,
deep down he was simply a theocrat who had fundamentalist sensibilities. He visited in February
1991 Libya and then Turkey, where observers noticed that he refused to pay homage at the grave
of the man who had helped to secularize Turkey - Kemal Atatürk.149 A few months later in May
Izetbegović visited Iran. Finally in July 1991 Izetbegović traveled again to Turkey and asked that
Bosnia be able to join the Organization of the Islamic Conference, a forum which many saw as
having fundamentalist tendencies. All of these overtures to Islamic nations were seen as
provocative to many, especially of course to the Serbs.150 Yet it is hard to see what choice
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Izetbegović had here, since there was a need for him to develop closer relations with Islamic
nations so that he could acquire weapons and other forms of assistance from them in the case of
war. Perhaps harder to understand is something like Izetbegović’s unwillingness to
unequivocally condemn his Islamic Declaration, not only before but after the 1990 elections as
well, which made it that much easier for his opponents to question his motives. On around 23
May 1991, for instance, Karadžić not unreasonably - although undoubtedly he had ulterior
motives - in a press conference asked Izetbegović to publicly disown the Declaration, something
that as we have seen Izetbegović apparently never did.151 But again, one must acknowledge that
Izetbegović perhaps faced certain constraints, in this case the hard-line faction of the SDA who
might have been angered by such a dramatic attempt on his part to ingratiate himself with the
Bosnian Serbs and Croats.
On a more mundane level, one can point to the fact that Izetbegović either did not or was
unable to do anything about ethnic favoritism at the government level, with corruption and
paralysis continuing to affect government right up to the eve of war. In the Bosnian parliament,
for instance, Muslim members would leave sessions to pray. For a member of a delegation to the
Federal Parliament, rather than the required Yugoslav, the SDA sent a Muslim.152 And so on. To
be sure, all three of the major ethnic political parties did these sort of shenanigans, but that is
exactly the point – Izetbegović was just as bad as the others as far as this government corruption
was concerned and was not able to rise above it all and provide an example of dispassionate, fair
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leadership that members of all ethnic groups in Bosnia could look up to. Izetbegović’s
unwillingness or inability to create a broad coalition during the 1990 campaign was coming back
to haunt him now, with hardliners in his party being able to radicalize the SDA because the
moderates within it were too weak.
Too much should not be made of Izetbegović’s negligence here though, especially
considering how hard it is to fight governmental corruption in any event. But let us suppose the
Izetbegović government actually had tried to create better safeguards which lessened corruption
within the government (e.g. prevented Muslims from unfairly dominating regional governments
where they were in the majority), or Izetbegović himself had been much more clear and vocal in
repudiating his Islamic Declaration and more forceful in arguing for a Bosnia that would
guarantee the rights of all of her citizens (and actually carrying out this commitment once he
gained power) - would this have made a difference? Probably not, since the forces outside of
Bosnia were exerting such a powerful and negative influence that even if Izetbegović had been a
Vaclav Havel-like figure it would not have made much difference. Although Bosnian Christians
could reasonably complain about some aspects of Izetbegović’s public rhetoric as well as some of
the corruption he condoned from the elections of November 1990 to the beginning of the Bosnian
War in April 1992, it was not these complaints which were propelling them to want to secede
from Bosnia – it was instead the Croatian and Serbian nationalisms being espoused from within
and without the Bosnian republic. Compared to the provocations of a Milošević or a Tuñman or a
Karadžić, Izetbegović’s pale in comparison.
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Chapter Four
War Bringing Out the Worst
Ask almost any thoughtful Serb about the Bosnian war, and unless he is totally
radicalized what he will likely say in the course of the discussion is something like this: Yes, the
Serbs were not blameless during the conflict, but it was a conflict that not only one but all three
ethnic groups contributed to, and it is false or wrong to hold the Serbian leadership and those who
went along with them as being uniquely, or even more responsible, for the starting of the war
and/or the atrocities which occurred during it. It is an understandable sentiment, one which is not
without truth. As we have already seen, although Izetbegović may have not been as openly
threatening in his acts and rhetoric as individuals like Karadžić were before the war, he did do his
fair share as far as promoting an exclusivist Muslim ideology was concerned and making a
contribution to the boiling cauldron of Bosnia. And during the war itself as we shall see, along
with their Muslim counterparts many Serbs and Croats civilians were victims of Bosnian
aggression, whether they were murdered or ethnically cleansed by Bosnian forces, or were
subjected to lesser but no less-real indignities by Bosnian officials. Because of all of this, it is
unsurprising that most Serbs and quite a few analysts and scholars argue that what happened in
Bosnia was not a war of aggression at all but simply a civil war, where any sort of blame cannot
be attributed to any one side.
It is the fact that the Serbs started the war, and even more significantly, the way they
started it, that more than anything else makes it most difficult, and indeed impossible, for this
thesis to be sustained. As Gale Stokes common-sensically puts it, the Serbs were not entirely
illegitimate in wanting some kind of autonomy in Croatia and Bosnia, especially since Kosovo
and the Voivodina in Serbia had been granted autonomous status in the earlier years of the
Yugoslav state by Tito; what was illegitimate was trying to solve this problem not by appealing to
the international community but simply ethnically cleansing the Bosnian and Croatian territories
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of non-Serbs.153 Up until the outbreak of the war, it would not be implausible to argue that in
spite of the vulgarity and provactiveness of many of their actions, Karadžić and his supporters
were simply playing hardball and doing all they could to avoid being put in the position of a
Serbian minority in a Muslim-majority state. Thus even something like the secret arming of the
Serbs, while not admirable or ethical per se, was simply the way the game was played in the
brutal world of Balkan politics, and the Serbs were simply a lot better at this dangerous game than
Izetbegović and his Bosnians. Nasty realpolitik it might have been, but still potentially
justifiable. When the Serbs decided to invade Bosnia though, terrorize non-Serbs and even
murder them, and drive countless civilians out of their homes, they crossed the line which
separates legitimate statecraft from simple barbarity. Whatever the flaws of Izetbegović before
and at the beginning of the war, he was not guilty of that kind of barbarism.
What Izetbegović was guilty of at the beginning of the war was of being rather
unprepared. When the JNA and the Bosnian Serbs initiated their vicious assault on towns like
Biljena and Zvornik in eastern Bosnia, Izetbegović and his army was already in a weak position
as it was because of the severe inferiority of their arms, with the Serbs having a 9:1 advantage in
weaponry.154 But Izetbegović made things worse through many of his actions that can in no way
be blamed on his army’s military deficit. Perhaps the strangest aspect of Izetbegović’s conduct at
this time was his trust that the JNA would simply act to keep order in Bosnia rather than as an
arm of Serbian aggression. For example, earlier at the end of 1991 Izetbegović had submitted to

153

Gale Stokes, “From Nation to Minority: Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia at the Outbreak of the Yugoslav
Wars,” Problems of Post-Communism 52, no. 6 (November/December 2005):13-14. One might quibble a
little with Stokes’ reasoning, arguing that Serbian unwillingness to utilize the international community’s
help in solving their autonomy problem might not have been terribly wrong considering the UN’s
subsequent ineffectiveness during the 1992-1995 war. Still, Stokes’ larger point is correct.
154
Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets, The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo
(Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2008), 26. However, Izetbegović deserves some credit
for attempting to create an army that was truly multi-ethnic – a Croat was the chief of staff and a Serb was
deputy commander. A handbook printed at the time had military emblems named after a Serbian, a
Croatian, and a Muslim historical figure, and both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets were used. Finally
twenty percent of the army was Serb and Croat. Also at the time a new Bosnian flag came out with the
medieval fleurs-de-lis on it, a representation of Bosnia’s multi-ethnicity. Marko Attila Hoare, The History
of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day (London: Saqi, 2007), 366-367.

78

the late 1991 JNA order for the Bosnian TOs (Territorial Defense units, or local army units within
Bosnia) to give up their remaining weapons to the federal army, although this order was at times
not obeyed at the local level.155 This sort of action made no sense, since Izetbegović had already
seen how the JNA had pummeled Croatia and driven out populations there in 1991 – how could
he have expected the JNA to have treated Bosnia any differently? Since the role of the JNA had
always been that of a federal army designed to preserve the entire state of Yugoslavia anyway,
why was it going to act to preserve order in Bosnia after the she had just seceded from the
Yugoslav state?
It was also during this time that one of the most terrible episodes of a very terrible war
occurred, the murders, rapes, and ethnic cleansings of mostly Bosnian Muslims who had willingly
given up their arms to their aggressors just a few months or weeks before. This disarmament had
been a result of Izetbegović’s peace efforts before the war started, in which he had exhorted
Bosnians to demonstrate their pacifistic intentions by relinquishing their arms to the JNA.
Amazingly, many Bosnians listened to their president and complied, undoubtedly further
stimulating the aggression of the Serbs and severely diminishing the morale of those Bosnians
who realized during the first few months of the war that they had been taken for fools by just
giving away their arms to their eventual murderers. But because Izetbegović’s strategy
apparently dictated that the Bosnians be seen as victims at the beginning of the war, this action
makes some sense since if the Bosnians had openly kept their weapons then the Serbs could have
argued that they were being intransigent, and the international community might have seen the
Bosnians as just one of the warring parties in a civil war.
Finally, any nationwide coordinated plan of defense was lacking as far as many of the
government officials in cities and towns of Bosnia were concerned, with many of them simply
having no idea of what to do when war started. For example, at the beginning of the Serbian
offensive the Muslim and Croatian-controlled municipal assembly in Modrica would not mobilize
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the local territorial defense units for fear of antagonizing local Serbs.156 Or consider what Amir
Karadžić, who was in Prijedor when the war started, told me, “When we had a curfew in the
morning, so I knocked on my mayor’s door and said to him, ‘You were my language professor,
now mayor, tell me what I should do!’ He answered, ‘I don’t know.’ Disappointing answer for
me!”157 Considering that the mayors and administrators in a few towns and cities were able to
take the initiative on their own and provide some form of resistance for a time - in the eastern
city of Tuzla, for instance, Serbs, Muslims, and Croats worked together to put up a defense until
May 1992158 - it is interesting to speculate what a well-coordinated, guerilla warfare-type action
on the part of the towns and cities of Bosnia might have accomplished against a Serbian aggressor
that, all of their armament superiority notwithstanding, were often quite cowardly in their fighting
capacity.159 Still, the military might of the Serbs and JNA eventually told, and by the end of 1992
much of Bosnia, with the exception of central Bosnia, northwest Bosnia, and isolated cities in the
east was either under Croatian160 or Serbian control.161
In spite of the many difficulties Izetbegović now faced, there seemingly was a light of
hope shining across the ocean in the United States, where the-then governor of Arkansas Bill
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Clinton was running a competitive campaign to unseat President Bush. One of Clinton’s major
foreign policy themes was Bush’s ineffectiveness in the Balkans and the need to do more there
(e.g. bombing Serbian targets), with his saying for instance on 2 August 1992, “If the horrors of
the Holocaust taught us anything, it is the high cost of remaining silent and paralyzed in the face
of genocide. We must discover who is responsible for these actions and take steps to bring them
to justice for these crimes against humanity.”162 Such rhetoric naturally gave Izetbegović hope
that with the potential inauguration of a Clinton administration at the beginning of the next year,
the power of the U.S. could be brought to bear against Serbian and Croatian aggression.
This trust in the assistance of the Clinton administration, who were elected in November
of 1992, was undoubtedly influential in Izetbegović’s decision to at times not support the
Vance/Owen Peace Plan, the earliest of various proposals during the Bosnian war which were
aimed at ending the fighting. This plan, which in essence divided Bosnia into 10 cantons under a
weak central government, while not actually repudiated by the Clinton administration, was never
strongly defended by them either since it was seen as simply rewarding Serbian aggression.
Izetbegović was able to pick up on this lack of enthusiasm and along with the Bosnian Serbs was
able to obstruct its development through the autumn and winter of 1992/1993; Vance/Owen
eventually died. It was replaced by suggestions that Clinton would endorse the “Lift and Strike”
Plan, which aimed to end the arms embargo that had been imposed on all of the Yugoslav nations
the previous year, and to have NATO bomb Serbian targets. Although Izetbegović’s military
difficulties had increased even more by this point with the beginning of clashes with the Bosnian
Croats a few months earlier,163 creating what would soon be a war on not one but two fronts,164 he
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could still be comforted by the fact that NATO would apparently soon get into the act with air
strikes against Serbian targets and that he would be able to get more weapons to his severely
unarmed soldiers due to the ending of the arms embargo. Seemingly the strategy of getting the
international community on his side had worked, and although he had a tremendous amount of
ground to make up he could take some satisfaction in the situation after the last horrible year.
Needless to say, Izetbegović was soon to be cruelly disappointed. Clinton, fearful of the
dangers of being drawn into Bosnia and having to send troops just as the Bush administration had
been, started to have second thoughts and decided not to give forceful support to his “Lift and
Strike” policy. Because Clinton was not fully committed, when the Secretary of State Warren
Christopher tried to sell “Lift and Strike” at meetings with European leaders in May 1993 they all
rather harshly said they could not support it, fearful as they were that the peace keepers they had
recently installed in Bosnia would get harmed, and that the war could spread into other countries
and be prolonged. Instead the Europeans wanted to create “safe areas” for Bosnians, a policy
Izetbegović said amounted to putting Muslims on “reservations” – nonetheless the Americans
would eventually agree to this policy and the Bosnians had to go along. About two weeks later
Christopher testified before a House Affairs Committee and in a huge about-face said that acts of
genocide were being perpetrated by the Muslims against Serbs, and in June he said that Bosnia
involved America’s humanitarian interests but not her vital interests. Also in June new
negotiations were being conducted in Geneva for a three-way partition of Bosnia, with the
Muslim area only being 23% of the territory,165 and the diplomat David Owen put pressure on
Izetbegović by supporting his rival Fikret Abdić - who had earlier simply left his place in the
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presidency to go back to his fiefdom in Bihać and who was now openly supportive of making a
deal with the Serbs.166
Along with these terrible signs coming from the international community was the bad
situation on the military front. The Bosnians were suffering from a severe shortage of arms at
this time, with only one out of two soldiers even being able to field a gun as late as the end of
1993167 – this while trying to fight against two armies simultaneously. The Serbs had managed to
widen the so-called Brcko corridor on 12 July 1993, a crucial strip of land in northern Bosnia
which linked the Serbs in Croatia and in western Bosnia with the Serbs in Serbia and eastern
Bosnia (basically a conduit for weapons flows between the Serbs in Serbia and the Serbs in
Bosnia).168 Ethnic cleansing of towns and villages around Bosnia was continuing, and the siege
of Sarajevo was well into its second year now, with the poor residents there perhaps still being
capable of amazement that the international community was doing nothing to help them.169 Pretty
soon though this incredulousness would largely change into a feeling of betrayal, with the
Bosnians in plain English believing that they had simply been screwed by the U.S. and Europe (or
stabbed in the back, allowed to become the Palestinians of Europe – pick your metaphor).
Izetbegović himself started to take on a despairing tone at this time and seemed to suggest that
some kind of partition might be inevitable. On 5 July Izetbegović gave an interview in which he
made such statements as, “Sometimes I ask myself, ‘How can I live at all?’” and “I can’t accept it
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[partition], but it seems that it is becoming an ugly, tragic reality.”170 It was definitely the worst of
times for Izetbegović and his people.
It was the horror of what Bosnia was going through, and connected to it the failure of the
West to defend Bosnia that at least one scholar, Marko Attila Hoare, sees as the key reason for
why Izetbegović and the SDA ended up more radical and promoted a more Islamic-oriented state.
Since they were starting to realize that the chances of a whole and united Bosnia were becoming
increasingly unrealistic, the reasoning goes, then at least they could have the consolation of a
smaller nation made up mostly of Muslims which would be more fully devoted to Islamic
principles.171 It is a very important argument to think about as we survey Izetbegović’s actions
and rhetoric henceforth, for it raises what could be called the functionalist/intentionalist problem
– Was it Izetbegović’s desire all along to create an Islamic state within Bosnia, as some of his
harshest critics would argue, or was it the pressures of war as well as the new situation he faced
that pushed him in this new direction? Or, to think common-sensically, was it a little of both?
Since the evidence is fragmentary and there is no smoking gun to provide any sort of definitive
answer, we must be content with educated guesses. Nonetheless, in spite of the fact that no
certainty can be provided for this question, understanding at least might be possible.172
For evidence of war itself making Izetbegović more nationalistic, Hoare points to a
speech Izetbegović gave to the Bosnian parliament on 27 August 1993 (when the military
situation was still very precarious) where he again sadly said that Bosnia might well have to be
partitioned; at around the same time war aims were being developed for a Bosnia limited to only
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those areas in which Muslims were in the majority before the war. Hoare also mentions a 27
September 1993 session of parliament in which the members voted to call all Muslims Bosniaks,
a term that had traditionally referred to Bosnians of all ethnicities but no longer – Bosnia would
now be considered the national home of Bosniaks/Muslims, just as Croatia was the home of
Croats and Serbia of Serbs. The intent of this was to influence Bosnians into seeing their country
as a country simply for Muslims, and not one also for Serbs and Croats.173 Izetbegović would
give an example of supporting this ethnic separatism the next year by publicly condemning the
habit of many Sarajevans’ tying different nations’ flags together to symbolize the multi-ethnicity
of Bosnia.174
Consider also the many refugees from smaller towns and villages, many of whom were
more nationalistic and religiously-oriented Muslims who brought their more fervent beliefs with
them when they fled to Bosnia’s cities, thus diluting the more secular milieus there. The war and
the perceived failure of the West to help them in their great time of need also not unnaturally
made more traditionally secularist Muslims in the cities seek solace in religious belief.
Izetbegović’s greater stress then on encouraging a more public and dogmatic Islam within Bosnia
as the war progressed could simply be seen as a reflection of the same phenomenon that was
going on within the Bosnians themselves.175 Yet there are also certainly links which can be made
between Izetbegović’s actions here and some of the pronouncements he had made in his Islamic
Declaration decades earlier. Izetbegović’s strong stress on educating Muslims for instance in the
Declaration176 can find its counterpart in the rather heavy-handed evangelism the SDA promoted
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in Sarajevo during the war, where pamphlets on the Koran were passed out one day at a SDA
party rally or where public schools would only allow religious classes on Islam and not
Orthodoxy and Catholicism as well as had traditionally been the practice. The Bosnian cultural
minister also said that Muslims should only marry other Muslims, although some observers saw
this as more of a nationalistic exhortation than a religious one.177
Another echo of the Declaration can be found in Izetbegović’s efforts to ensure
uniformity within the SDA and other organizations – one of the faults of the Pakistan experiment,
he had written decades earlier, was that the Pakistani leaders had failed to have “tried and true
individuals at the head of a resolute and homogenous organization.”178 During the Bosnian War,
this often translated into purging those who did not toe the religious or political line of the SDA.
In the army for instance, the original multi-ethnicity of that entity began to be repudiated and
Serbs and Croats were eventually weeded out or decided to leave because of Muslim pressure.
There was also the problem of a lack of competency on the part of officers, many of whom were
assigned to positions not because of their ability but as a result of their devotion to Islam or the
Izetbegović government.179 Needless to say, this had a deleterious impact on the army’s
performance. Individuals in professions outside the government, for example journalists, also
lost their jobs if they were not members of the SDA.180
One very important aspect of the increased Islamization and radicalization of Bosnia
during the war years though which has received much attention, that of the incursion of Arab
fighters or mujahideen into the country,181 probably cannot be said to be linked to any plans
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Izetbegović might have had to make Bosnia into a more Islamic nation. There is no evidence at
all that Izetbegović had any sympathy for the cruelty or the crudeness of the mujahideen’s
ideology, which would make sense since even in the Declaration as we have seen he had
generally argued against the use of violence in promoting Islam except in the case of
overthrowing the state of a people who had already mainly accepted Islam. Besides, in a practical
sense the mujahideen were mostly nothing but trouble for Izetbegović, creating havoc in central
Bosnia (where they were mostly located) through such things as their mutilations of soldiers and
civilians, ethnic cleansing of Croats, and intimidation of the local Muslim populations who
tended to be totally turned off by the practices of these long-haired and uncouth fanatics.
Izetbegović had to let them fight though because he was so reliant on the military and financial
aid of countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran, for whom money and arms was contingent on
allowing these fighters to come into Bosnia.182 Because the arms embargo was still in place and
the West would not, in the main, provide the Bosnians with any military supplies or training,183
Izetbegović could quite reasonably argue that he was simply accepting friends where he could
find them, a perfectly legitimate principle that certainly has a long pedigree in the history of
foreign relations (Just consider the anti-apartheid activists in South Africa who accepted help
from countries like the Soviet Union and Libya). Also, truth be told, these foreign fighters were
often brave and strong soldiers and were useful for certain operations, especially near the end of
the war. The price of all of this though was a certain stigma that would be placed upon Bosnia as
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a result of her becoming a terrorist base for Al Qa’ida, the establishment of which was the real
motive for some mujahideen coming to fight there in the first place.184
Not all the negative aspects of Izetbegović’s conduct during the war should necessarily
be linked to his desire to make Bosnia a more Islamic society. There was for instance the much
more old fashioned and mundane corruption and nepotism he allowed to thrive within the SDA
Izetbegović ran not merely a tight but a remarkably closed ship, with little room for alternate
views or disagreements – never a good thing for a statesman who needs always fresh information
and who at times needs to be told things that he does not want to hear. As one high official
encapsulated the situation, “Everyone who wasn’t obedient was gotten rid of. Instead of
organizing people, they were only hoping for help from abroad.” This lack of pro-active spirit
that the official was referring to was manifested for example in the lack of weapons which were
produced within Bosnia. Such military production was very doable, but was mostly prevented by
SDA members who were skimming the cream off the top of donations given by Middle Eastern
countries; these officials did not want to risk the money they embezzled going to Bosnian
businessmen who would actually produce weapons. Since the major problem the Bosnian
soldiers had during the war was lack of arms, there was naturally something very odious about all
of this. This problem of financial corruption also went right up the ranks of the SDA to the
president, with political and financial patronage clearly flowing to Izetbegović and to members of
his family like his son, Bakir.185
Even worse, this corruption probably had the coarsening effect of deadening Izetbegović
and the SDA’s moral sense or feelings of responsibility for human rights abuses which were
occurring under their noses. An apparent example of this involved the Sarajevo gangster Caco,
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who helped to provide order in the city during the first part of the war in exchange for the SDA ‘s
turning a blind eye to his extortion schemes and murders of Serbs. To be fair this sort of
nastiness is a perennial feature of war, with the rule of law at times being legitimately neglected
because energies must be devoted to other more pressing concerns. With the need to fight back
against the Serbs in the hills surrounding the city, it could be argued, the Sarajevo government
officials could not always devote as much attention or resources as they would have liked to
actually policing the city, and the extreme situation they were in forced them to temporarily rely
on such unsavory characters as Caco. Yet when the SDA government finally decided that they
had had enough of Caco and his gang and raided their headquarters on October 1993, killing
Caco in the process, their motive for doing this seems to have simply been that they were fearful
of what he knew about the SDA and their shady dealings, and not the fact that he was unleashing
such chaos in the city.186
Much more significant and important is the more general issue how much this lost moral
sense contributed to the SDA/Bosnian government’s persecution of Serbs and Croats during the
war, and indeed whether much of it was pre-meditated rather than being spontaneous. As many
Serbs especially would argue, during the war the Bosnians decided that what was good for the
goose was good for the gander, and with their persecution the Muslims would in turn oppress,
murder, and ethnically cleanse Croats and Serbs. The only difference between Muslim suffering
and Christian suffering, goes this argument, was that only the former was reported, but if
reporters had done their jobs then they would have realized that the Bosnians were as responsible
for terror during the war as the Serbs and Croats were. As can be imagined, trying to find a
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satisfactory response to this regarding the Bosnians in general is very tricky, and in regards to
Izetbegović even more so.
First, to get back to the intentionalist/functionalist problem, is there any evidence that
even before the war Izetbegović desired any sort of ethnic cleansing or oppression against
Bosnian Christians that would have made it easier to realize his supposed dream of an Islamic
Bosnia? Absolutely none – as has already been mentioned twice Izetbegović was exactly against
this kind of violence.187 What about when the war actually started though – did it then give
Izetbegović a green light to pursue the Islamization of Bosnia through the expulsion of Christians
when it would have been red in a time of peace? There is no evidence which can conclusively
show this. In the Declaration Izetbegović does express great admiration for Islamic liberation
movements like those conducted against the French in Algeria and against the British in Suez,
seeing these as moving examples of the Muslim masses rising against oppressors188 - naturally a
comparison could be made with the Bosnian (made up mainly, although certainly not exclusively,
of Muslims) struggle against the Serbs and Croats, although I have not found an example of
Izetbegović making such an analogy during the war. One can also point out that when the joint
Bosnian-Croat Federation was inaugurated in March of 1994 (see paragraph below) only Croats
and Bosniaks were considered to be constituent peoples in the Federation constitution,189 but this
exclusivist attitude could easily have stemmed as much from simple bitterness against the Serbs
because of their war aggression as from any desire to create a more Islamic state.
Second, was there - for whatever reason - a deliberate policy of persecution conducted by
the Izetbegović government against the Bosnian Christians that cannot be attributed simply to the
sort of mindless violence that arises in the heat of war? Undoubtedly the SDA at least condoned
or indirectly encouraged a general policy of discrimination against Serbs and Croats, as can easily
187
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be seen in the just-mentioned Federation constitution, and also in such things as Serbs’ being
forced to leave their professions, and criminals or unscrupulous individuals being given basically
free rein to frighten Serbs into leaving cities like Zenica, Sarajevo, and west Mostar. This was
truly sad, since thousands of Bosnian Croats and Serbs throughout Bosnia had demonstrated their
fidelity to a multi-ethnic and democratic Bosnia by staying in the cities and not joining
Karadžić’s or Mate Boban’s armies in the first year and a half or so of the conflict190 (50,000 of
the 250,000 Sarajevans were Serbs as late as July 1993).191 By the end of 1993 most Serbs had
left the cities and had gone to the Republic of Serbia, Montenegro, Serbia, or abroad with only
80,000-100,000 Serbs left in the Federation after the war.192 Although Izetbegović’s SDA surely
was not responsible for this entire exodus, it was at least partly. There is the even more significant
question of whether there was any sort of deliberate SDA policy to murder Christian civilians
during the war or to intently drive them out of their homes that cannot be better ascribed to the
normal – if that is the best word – sort of collateral damage that occurs in any war. To refer again
to Hoare, who carefully studied the military aspects of the Bosnian war, he argues that there is no
evidence of that, with his citing as an example the Bosnian chief of staff for the first year or so of
the war Sefer Halilović, who was summoned to the Hague for war crimes but was acquitted of
any sort of wrongdoing.193
Finally, we can step back to a third level and address the even more general question of
how the sufferings of Bosnian Christians can be compared with those of the Bosnian Muslims
during the war. Although this question touches on Izetbegović more indirectly, it can help out
somewhat with that issue of proportionality, in which we can attempt to judge in a negative sense
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how much separates Izetbegović and his Bosnians, from say, Karadžić and his Serbs, in the harm
that he and they contributed to others during the war. Consider the number of war dead from the
Bosnian war, according to one recent estimate to be 93,837, of whom 63,687 were Muslims,
24,216 Serbs, 5,057 Croats, and 877 others. For our purposes though the more significant –
although not more valuable or important - numbers involve civilians, since unlike the killing of
soldiers the killing of civilians caries a greater stigma, and especially if done intentionally in
which it constitutes war crimes. Here the disparity between Muslims and Serbs is very wide, with
30,514 Muslim civilians being killed or murdered to 1,978 Serbian civilians being killed or
murdered,194 a 15:1 ratio. This does not, of course, suggest that the loss of a Serb is any less tragic
than the loss of a Muslim. It does strongly suggest though that is far as the responsibility for
harm done to individual peoples, Karadžić, the SDS, the JNA, the Bosnian Serb army, and those
Bosnian Serb civilians who supported them were far guiltier of inflicting unjust force – namely
intentional and premeditated murder – against Bosnian Muslims in proportion to what
Izetbegović, the SDA, the Bosnian Army, and their supporters inflicted against Serbs. For this
reason at least, the argument that Izetbegović and his Bosnians was simply the moral equivalent
of Karadžić and his Serbs during the war is another thesis that is also unsustainable.
Up to this point the coverage thus far of Izetbegović has been fairly negative, so it
behooves me to say that no individual is of one piece, and any honest assessment of Izetbegović
and his statesmanship must also include the positive features he brought to his exercise of the
Bosnian presidency (admittedly, features which were not Herculean, but positive nonetheless).
One of his strengths was his ability to grab the world’s attention and keep it focused on what was
happening in Bosnia for so long. Celebrities and journalists were a perennial fixture in Bosnia,
whether it was Susan Sontag staging a performance of Waiting for Godot with malnourished
Bosnian actors and or actresses, or Bianca Jagger making her appearance for a few hours at the
Sarajevo airport and then quickly flying off again, or Timothy Garton Ash finding Sontag and the
194

Marko Attila Hoare, The History of Bosnia, 402.

92

journalists Christopher Hitchens and David Rieff (Sontag’s son) in a bar in Tuzla. The
shenanigans of say, a Julie Christie taking photographs of Bosnian children giving a ‘V For
Victory’ sign or reading poems with this line, “Sarajevo, glowing white…. as a translucent china
cup….”, this may have all been a bit much for the people of Bosnia,195 but such things did after
all help to keep Bosnia on the world’s radar, even while this did not compel the world leaders to
do much. Still, the fact that Bosnia was always on the television screen and in the newspapers
because of the actions of these journalists and celebrities did at least prevent the statesmen from
ignoring what was happening, and in the end they did feel they had to do something.
Again, some of this at least was the doing of Izetbegović, who was capable of being a bit
of the showman in his beret and military fatigues, the philosopher/king who would rather be
sitting in a café and pontificating about Kant but for the time being was simply doing his duty as
a soldier. To many reporters and Westerners no doubt he was able to project the image of the chic
and thoughtful Muslim, a clean-shaven, articulate, and often shy man who was devout but not
threatening, and certainly not at all like those nasty, dark, bearded guys from the Middle East.
They should all be like this, is maybe what some of them thought. Consider a question
Christopher Hitchens, the prototypical example of the hard-boiled reporter, asked Izetbegović at a
1992 press conference: What did he think of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie? In Hitchens’
words, “He [Izetbegović] gave the defining reply of the “moderate” Muslim, saying that he did
not like the book but could not agree to violence against the author.”196 Probably Izetbegović’s
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biggest catch was Bernard-Henri Levy, who did all he could to influence his fellow French to
support the Bosnians (e.g. he influenced Francois Mitterrand to make his famous trip on June 28
1992 to open the Sarajevo airport).197 Levy also made a film that prominently featured
Izetbegović in a positive light - Bosna! - which was played at the Cannes Film Festival in 1994,
he and would publicly defend Izetbegović against such accusations as that of being an Islamic
fundamentalist.198
Another virtue of Izetbegović’s was his perseverance, the flip side of his more regrettable
tendency to be indecisive. Although it might sound flippant or shallow to say so, the fact is that
Izetbegović was simply able to hang in there when the going got tough,199 and was able to wait
things out when Bosnia’s situation was at its darkest.200 We have seen that Izetbegović offered
hints of capitulation to partition in July of 1993, but whether it was because of yet again the
prodding of members of his party or simple personal conscience, he decided against this and he –
and Bosnia – fought on.201 And after a few months the tide did start to turn slightly, with the
Bosnians winning a battle against the Croats on 4 November 1993 in the town of Vareš. At
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around the same time the more liberal-oriented SDA member Haris Silajdžić, who was very
opposed to any sort of partition, was made prime minister, an action that many saw as an example
of the Bosnians’ resolution.202 Then a few months later the Croats and Muslims decided it was in
their interests to bury the hatchet and to focus their attention on the Serbs, something that
eventually led to their signing an agreement in Washington in March of 1994. This Washington
Agreement, as it was called, brought about the Bosnian-Croat Federation, the one half of the
future Bosnian state. Although by signing this agreement he was in essence submitting to what
would eventually end up being simply another form of partition separating the Bosnian Muslims
and Croats from the Bosnian Serbs, Izetbegović at least had the consolation of knowing that his
Muslims would not just be in some mini-state stuck between what could have easily been a
greater Croatia and a greater Serbia.
Still, things had not become all that much better for Izetbegović - although he did not
know it, he was facing another year and a half of war. Again though, he continued to persevere,
yet one is hard pressed to find more to his military strategy than simply his hanging in there and
fighting on, hoping the Europeans and the U.S. would becoming more involved in the conflict,203
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and taking territory back from the Bosnian Serbs. But then maybe nothing else was really
necessary. One thing that I have been impressed by in interviewing my admittedly limited
number of subjects is how little they have criticized Izetbegović, and the one criticism that has
been made of him by Amir Karadžić from Prijedor is that, unsurprisingly, Izetbegović was not
able to get Prijedor back from the Serbs.204 There seems to have been little desire on the part of
the Bosnians to accept a deal during the war that would be totally dishonorable, in spite of all of
their suffering. From this time on it does not seem that Izetbegović himself gave any thought to
such a deal either (until the Americans would force him to accept one in 1995), and he
experienced no political price because of it. Indeed, this is rather faint praise, but it could be
argued that a positive aspect of his political leadership was that no effort was made at all to knock
him off from the presidency (politically or violently), and that for all three and a half years of the
war his position was utterly secure. Some of this was probably due to his authoritarianism and
the rally-around-the-leader phenomenon which often occurs during war, but to have lasted for as
long as he did Izetbegović must have been making at least some connection with his people – no
small thing, that.
No small thing either was his ability to get up morning after morning to lead the
Bosnians, since it was a matter of, as they say, one damn thing after the other. General Mladić of
the Bosnian Serbs in April 1994 taking UN peacekeepers hostage and tying them to trees, causing
Yasushi Akashi the special UN envoy to refuse to authorize NATO air strikes – a pathetic display
if there ever was one. Izetbegović, a Bosnian, having to fight another Bosnian, his rival Fikret
Abdić at his fiefdom in Bihać, something that caused many of Izetbegović’s troops to be bogged
the Serbs) and U.N. officials who cast a more wary eye on the purposes of the Muslim government. Ibid.,
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down in northwest Bosnia for two months in November and December of 1994. The massacre of
thousands of men and women at Srebrenica, a so-called “safe haven” in July 1995, the worst of
its kind since World War Two. The looting and torching of the town of Žepa by the Serbs at
around the same time.205 During all of this time the arms embargo was never lifted, and no
significant bombing of Serbian targets occurred.
Yet God writes straight with crooked lines, and of all people Franjo Tuñman helped come
to Izetbegović’s rescue. Although Tuñman totally despised Izetbegović and under normal
circumstances would have done nothing to help him, he wanted to make sure that a huge
constellation of Bosnian Serbs was not massed on the Croatian Krajina border. Thus Croatian
forces joined up with Bosnian forces in August 1995, and together they were able to take
significant areas in northwestern Bosnia during Operation ‘Storm.’ At around the same time,
after a Serbian shell had struck a Sarajevo marketplace and caused a massacre, NATO finally
started to bomb Serbian targets in Bosnia.206 These two factors would help create the incentive
for the Serbs to deal, and later of course in November Izetbegović, Tuñman, and Milošević would
meet in Dayton to attempt to arrive at peace.
What is interesting to mention though is a meeting Izetbegović had with Richard
Holbrooke, the new American negotiator for Bosnia, in Paris at the end of August 1995 when the
NATO bombing was going on. Holbrooke asked Izetbegović if he wanted a united Bosnia or a
Bosnia that was divided into two parts, and although Izetbegović seemed rather ambivalent about
it, he said he wanted a united Bosnia but that he would be willing to allow a lot of autonomy to
the Serbian part of it.207 Why he answered this way it is difficult to say; perhaps he hoped for a
united Bosnia that the Muslims would eventually be able to gain the upper hand in, or thought
that by simply allowing the Serbian portion to separate he would be rewarding Serbian
aggression. Yet one might hope that there was still a part of Izetbegović that remained committed
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to a democratic, multi-ethnic Bosnia, and was worthy of the honest but praiseworthy description
Holbrooke would later make of him:
He [Izetbegović] had kept the “idea” of Bosnia alive for years under the most difficult
circumstances. It was an extraordinary achievement, a tribute to his courage and determination.
At the age of seventy… he saw politics as a perpetual struggle. Even minor gestures of
reconciliation to those Serbs who were ready to re-establish some form of multi-ethnic
community were not easy for Izetbegović. His eyes had a cold and distant gaze; after so much
suffering, they seemed dead to anyone else’s pain. He was a devout Muslim, although not the
Bosnian ayatollah that his enemies portrayed. Yet though he paid lip service to the principles of a
multiethnic state, he was not the democrat that some supporters saw. He reminded me a bit of
Mao Zedong and other radical Chinese communist leaders – good at revolution, poor at
governance. But without him Bosnia would never have survived.208
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Conclusion
A Leader Despite Himself?
Alija Izetbegović’s statesmanship after Dayton is in many ways a melancholic tale, in
which some of his most negative traits (e.g. his penchant for authoritarianism) seemed to come to
the forefront. The year after Dayton, 1996, was an election year, and the SDA prime minister of
Bosnia, Haris Silajdžić, decided to form his own party, the more secular, multi-national Party for
Bosnia and Herzegovina, having had enough of the Islamic fundamentalism and heavyhandedness of Izetbegović and his cohorts. Silajdžić and other candidates entered the presidential
race at quite a disadvantage, though, as a result of the SDA’s control over the state airwaves
which limited their exposure, and one private media outlet, Radio 99, which was willing to give
other candidates more airtime was prohibited from setting up a television station because of the
SDA’s influence.209 SDA goons in northwest Bosnia intimidated and beat up political opponents,
210

and the political party continued to promote an intolerant ethnic nationalism.211 As with so

many “anti-Communist” nationalist leaders in post-1989 Europe, Izetbegović in his statesmanship
had in many ways become a carbon copy of the previous Yugoslav Communist leaders, using
their methods and imitating their actions.212
Because of all his political advantages Izetbegović was able to come in on top during the
elections and was elected the first president of a federal Bosnia. During the four years of his
presidency Izetbegović encouraged or at least allowed a certain Islamic
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fundamentalism\nationalism to flourish, whether it was through his efforts to get Father
Christmas - a traditional and ecumenical figure of Sarajevans who had always brought gifts to
little children and remained popular even in the post-Communist period – banned because of the
figure’s association with the Communist past,213 or his government’s encouragement of a more
Islamic educational curriculum in schools where students learned of such things as the richness
and greatness of the Ottoman period in history. Some of this emphasis on Islam, such as the-just
mentioned education example, was undoubtedly a legitimate reaction to the denial of Bosnia’s
religious traditions over decades of Communist rule, but other aspects of this Islamic renewal
were a little more radical, like the new requirement of greeting others in offices of the Bosnian
Federation with the greeting “Selaam aleikum” rather than the more traditional “Dobar dan.”214
As always though another, more noble side of Izetbegović could come out, as it did when
Izetbegović appeared in Tehran in December of 1997 and spoke of the need for the Islamic world
to have a greater understanding for the West. Telling his audience some “bitter truths,”
Izetbegović argued that the West was better educated, had more respect for human rights, and
provided more for the poor than the Islamic world. Acknowledging that there was also a “dark
side,” to the achievements of the West, Izetbegović nonetheless proceeded to take his own
Muslim brothers to task, saying that “Islam is the best, but we are not. These are two different
things, which we confuse. Instead of hating the West, we should compete with it. Didn’t [the]
Koran order this: compete in goodness.” Finally, Izetbegović strongly condemned terrorism in
his speech, not only because it was wrong and the Koran prohibited it but also because it was
“impractical” and “a possible cause of our future impotence.”215 It was Izetbegović at his best,
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issuing a clarion call for an Islamic humanism which combined the best of religious and secular
traditions.
But again as was so often the case with Izetbegović, there was a gap between his rhetoric
and his actions and he was not able to apply this kind of humanism in his own realm. This can
most easily be seen in his unwillingness to expel all of the mujahideen from Bosnia, a condition
he had agreed to when he signed the Dayton accords in 1995. Perhaps Izetbegović’s and other
SDA members’ bitterness at what they felt was the neglect of the West during the war was too
much for them, and with all of the flaws of the mujahideen these fighters had at least been there at
Bosnia’s side during her time of need, so Izetbegović and the SDA could not just get rid of them.
Thus a man like the Algerian Abu el-Ma’ali, who was responsible for terrorist actions within
Bosnia and in other countries like France during the late 1990s and had connections to Usama bin
Laden and Al’Qaida, was given protection by Izetbegović, and approximately two hundred
mujahideen were given Bosnian passports after the Dayton Accords. For a few years the U.S.
was willing to tolerate this, chastising the Bosnian government and saying the mujahideen had to
go while at the same time not doing too much about it, but September 11th changed all of that.
The Americans put enormous pressure on the Bosnian government then to be done with the
mujahideen problem and the Bosnians complied, expelling any Arab fighters who appeared at all
threatening. The foreign minister of Bosnia later said that on 11 September, “the world…. split
into a modern civilization and one of barbarism and terrorism…. Bosnia-Herzegovina has chosen
to ally itself with the civilized world. It has decided to be part of the solution, not part of the
problem… For our own sake… we chose sides.” The Bosnians and Bosnian media started to get
wind of Izetbegović’s foot dragging as far as the mujahideen had been concerned and raised some
ruckus about it, and apparently the U.S. government made its displeasure known to Izetbegović as
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well. In October 2001 Izetbegović relinquished his position as leader of the SDA, a year after he
had stepped down from the presidency for reasons of health.216
Perhaps Izetbegović’s poor health was augmented by the realization on his part that the
more pure, Islamic-oriented society which had been his hope for Bosnia was nowhere close to
coming to fruition. In spite of the efforts of the SDA over the years to create a more Islamic
milieu within Bosnia, as well as the rediscovery some Muslims individually had of their faith as a
result of the war, most Bosnian Muslims remained – or eventually fell back to being after an
initial period of religious fervor – fairly secular in their outlook. Although countries like Saudi
Arabia would continue to pour millions of dollars into Bosnia after the Bosnian War, through the
building of new mosques or the sending of missionaries to instruct the Bosnian people, most
Bosnian Muslims were turned off by the ugly Saudi architecture which replaced centuries-old
Ottoman era mosques or the fanatical lecturers of Wahhabi theology who could care less about
Bosnian Islamic traditions.217 Places like the Iranian Cultural Center in Sarajevo remained empty
while mini-skirted women headed off to the nearest bar, and Bosnians thought more about the
troubled economy and keeping Muslim-inhabited territory than about such abstract ideas as belief
or salvation.218 Even the success of Izetbegović’s own SDA, interestingly enough, depended upon
their in many ways being more nationalistic in an ethnic sense than being totally religious, since
they still had to appeal to voters who remained for the most part secular. The SDA therefore
216
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faced this Catch-22 – if they went overboard in their promotion of certain Islamist ideas they
would become irrelevant, but if they desired to remain in power they increasingly would have to
jettison their religious beliefs.219 Rather than being a great meeting point between the Christian
West and the Muslim East, to allude to the title of one of Izetbegović’s books, Bosnia was
becoming a secular nation just like the rest of Europe. With this awareness perhaps Izetbegović
passed away on 19 October 2003.220
The authors of the obituaries and eulogies who discussed Izetbegović’s legacy after his
death tended to be fairly predictable and mundane in what they wrote about him, albeit honest
and balanced. The anonymous scribe of The Economist’s obituary was typical, noting that
Izetbegović’s true allegiance was to the sacred and not the more worldly milieu of the political,
something that made him unsuited to the role of president of Bosnia. The writer also gave the
usual lines about the West not giving Izetbegović the help he expected, the unwillingness of
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Izetbegović and the Bosnians to be a part of “Serboslavia,” Izetbegović’s sympathy for some
radical Islamic philosophies, and so on.221 Paddy Ashdown, one of the High Representatives sent
to Bosnia to oversee and help implement the Dayton Agreement there in 2002, was – as can be
expected – diplomatic in his assessment of Izetbegović, saying that in his role as elder statesman
Izetbegović had been committed to “the peaceful reconstruction of Bosnia,” even while not
always agreeing with the policies Ashdown felt should be enacted. Ashdown also recycled
Holbrooke’s line by saying that more than anybody else Izetbegović helped provide for the
survival of Bosnia.222
Much more interesting and perceptive was an unpublished essay written by the Bosnian
Serb columnist Gojko Berić of that noble institution Oslobodjenje, the Sarajevo newspaper which
remained multi-ethnic during the terrible years of the Bosnian war. Titled “A Leader Despite
Himself,” it was a political and not a real obituary, written right after Izetbegović had stepped
down from the presidency in October 2000, but in many ways Berić was still providing what
obituary writers traditionally provide, which is the summing-up of a life and career (although
with his unique knowledge of the Bosnian political scene Berić is able to provide a much more
nuanced and comprehensive view of Izetbegović that his future obituarists would not be able to
match). It is a useful essay then to analyze in some detail as we approach the end of this essay,
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for it provides a matrix to evaluate the important events in Izetbegović’s political career as well as
his political leadership, and it also can be used to help determine what his legacy might be.223
Attention should first be given to the obvious truth Berić points out, which is what a
strange bird Izetbegović really was and how he truly beat, as the expression goes, to his own
drum. Berić tells the story of the autumn 1998 elections which were approaching and journalists
were asking Izetbegović if he would run for a third term as a member of the state presidency. The
immediate answer Izetbegović gave them was bizarre: “If I were in my right mind, I wouldn’t
stand. I haven’t the strength for the problems, the difficulties, and the things that have to be
done.” Yet later Izetbegović would again appear before the gathered journalists and tell them,
“Balkan leaders don’t like stepping down from power. I’ve decided to stand again.” There was
Izetbegović then in a nutshell – candid if not necessarily honest, flippant, and piously
otherworldly while at the same time demonstrating that he greatly coveted political power.
Perhaps more than anything else though the statements demonstrated Izetbegović’s
perennial indecisiveness. As Izetbegović himself once put the matter publicly - “I catch myself
thinking one thing in the morning, and completely the opposite in the afternoon.” Berić thinks
that Izetbegović’s opponents took advantage of his statement and made him look shifty and
without principle,224 which may very well be. But perhaps more importantly, did such
indecisiveness prevent Izetbegović from exercising his authority when it was most needed, most
significantly during the discussions over the various peace proposals before the war when the
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hard line elements in his SDA overruled the direction Izetbegović wanted to take? One could
argue that Izetbegović’s original inclinations to make deals with the Serbs and hopefully avert
war may or may not have been correct, but they were certainly consequential for the people of
Bosnia. Or rather, the unwillingness of Izetbegović to actually act on his convictions was
profoundly consequential – war might have still been possible if Izetbegović had agreed to
something like the Belgrade Initiative or the various cantonization plans the Serbs and Europeans
presented, but in his rejecting these plans he made war not just possible but inevitable. If a key
test of leadership is a willingness to follow one’s beliefs and convictions in spite of what others’
say, then Izetbegović arguably failed this test miserably. Yet this indictment fails to take into
account the perennial difficulty that we have seen Izetbegović constantly had to face, which is
that of public and party opinion. Although Izetbegović’s constant changes of opinion might have
been regrettable then, they were also in many ways necessary. For however much he may not
have liked it, Izetbegović had to be willing change positions if he saw that the public or the SDA
were just not willing to go along with him.
Another test it could be said that Izetbegović failed was his ability to use rhetoric to
achieve certain important political ends. The capacity to lead depends so much on a statesman’s
talent to use words in order to appeal to certain emotions and feelings of his countrymen. In the
case of Bosnia during the stressful transition she was going through during the early 1990s there
was a great need for Izetbegović to speak of traditions of Bosnian unity and to provide a vision
for the future in which Serbs, Croats, and Muslims could live together. Instead Izetbegović’s
vision was rather parochial – as Berić says, “He was not particularly enthusiastic about its
[Bosnia’s] traditional multi-cultural society… but conceived multi-ethnicity as a mechanical
assembly of three essentially separate nations.”225 That seems to me fairly true. It is interesting
when reading Izetbegović’s works -whether it be his Declaration or his prison journals or Islam
Between East and West – to see how little importance Bosnia actually had for him. He wrote
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page after page of course about Islam, or about the nature of science or even about Serbian
thinkers, but pondering what Bosnia meant to him seems to have been beyond his ken.226 Even if
Izetbegović could have been motivated to talk more about his Bosnian vision then during the
1990 campaign, probably the only time it might have made a difference, it is likely he lacked the
much of the necessary vocabulary to do so.227
But again, it must be emphasized that it is fairly unlikely that even if Izetbegović had had
such rhetorical, Andric-like abilities in spinning some kind of narrative for the ethnic groups of
Bosnia that would have provided some great rationale for their being able to live together
peacefully, it is hard to see how such abilities would have prevented Bosnia’s disintegration.
Words may often be powerful but they cannot stop a bullet, and especially with the introduction
of arms into Bosnia at the end of 1990 people felt compelled to take sides. To again quote
something John Lukacs says in many of his books, hard minorities are often more powerful than
soft majorities, and in the case of Bosnia especially there were those minorities who started to
have weapons and began to threaten those majorities – Serbs, Muslims, and Croats alike - who in
more normal circumstances might have had a live-and-let-live attitude but who now were
becoming frightened, radicalized, and defensive.
Berić goes on to argue the important point that war was inevitable because Bosnia never
could have submitted to have been a part of what Berić describes as Milošević’s fascist regime.
Put plainly, Berić thinks it would have been a kind of hell for Bosnia to have remained in a rump
Yugoslavia, so Izetbegović had no choice but to push for independence. By making this assertion
Berić is also criticizing that “Bosniak elite” (presumably Berić means here figures like
Zulfikarpašić) who believed that war could have been prevented by consenting to live under a
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Milošević regime that, ultimately, would not have been so awful.228 This problem of whether
Izetbegović should have accepted some kind of deal with the Serbs has been touched upon in
chapter three, but because it is such a critical question a lot more analysis is called for.
As was argued before, there is little reason to believe that any efforts Milošević might
have made to reform his rule would have definitely been permanent and long-lasting, and it is
quite easy to imagine Milošević’s abusing the rights of Bosnian Croats and Muslims within a
rump Yugoslavia if it had suited his interests. Yes, it might have been true as Zulfikarpašić said
to Alan Kuperman that after the Serbian invasion of Croatia in 1991 it was in Milošević’s
interests then to be gracious to the Bosnian Croats and Muslims, that Milošević wanted to
demonstrate a benevolent image to the West so that the economic embargo that had earlier been
imposed on Yugoslavia would be lifted.229 In victory, magnanimity, as Churchill would say. But
what about a year or so after this, when the West’s attention would be elsewhere, the idea of
Bosnia’s independence now being a dead letter as far as the world was concerned, and Milošević
having free rein to subtly repress the rights of Muslims and Croats within his Yugoslav state? We
have already seen that Milošević was willing to purge such institutions as the Serbian government
and media of those who would not support him during the late 1980s, that he encouraged the use
of violent crowds to achieve his interests in all of the republics, that he was willing to use the
Serbian military to intimidate members of the Kosovo assembly, and so on. Can there be any
doubt that Milošević would not have used these methods again in Bosnia if they could have
helped him to receive political support or achieve political objectives? Certainly Milošević
showed an inclination to continue to commit human rights abuses within his own realm after
Dayton in 1995, cracking down on political opposition within Serbia and killing Kosovar
Albanians. Democratic statesmanship was simply something unnatural for Milošević, as he
himself basically admitted to a French reporter when he said that he did not like multi-party
228
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systems, that a “system without parties” was better.230 Why then should Bosnians ever have
given this guy the benefit of the doubt?
Still, in considering the drawbacks of Bosnia’s remaining in a rump Yugoslavia, one also
has to honestly consider the possibility that a Milošević-led regime might not have been so bad
for the Bosnians, after all. One argument that Kuperman uses to defend this position is to observe
that Milošević’s rule over certain parts of Yugoslavia during the Bosnian War, while not exactly
benign, was not particularly harsh either. He points out, for instance, that the Hungarians in the
Voivodina and the Montenegrins were left alone by Milošević after he had made his rule secure
over those two peoples, as were the Muslims in the Sandžak region of Serbia who – unlike the
Muslims in Bosnia – were not subject to ethnic cleansing. He also quotes Zulfikarpašić, who
believed the perennial fear Bosnian Muslims had of being treated like Kosovar Albanians was
misguided: “The Kosovo excuse is the excuse of losers who are guilty for the catastrophe. It
would never have been the same here as in Kosovo.” Instead, Zulfikarpašić thinks Bosnia’s
situation would have been the same as Montenegro’s was during the war, a country “that did
pretty well. It survived and is fairly autonomous….”231 (Indeed, Montenegro was able to avoid
war and eventually gain independence from Yugoslavia only fourteen years after Bosnia was able
to gain hers). While it is hard to believe that Bosnia’s situation would have been as smooth as in
a country like Montenegro, which is mostly made up of Serbs and does not have a large
population of Muslims as Bosnia does, Zulfikarpašić is probably right to suggest that Bosnia
would not have been like Kosovo, where there have always been great tensions between the
Albanians and the Serbs.232
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But even if Bosnia under Milošević’s control would have been less benign than
somebody like Zulfikarpašić imagines it would have been, would not even that have been better
than what Bosnia ultimately had to go through – three and a half years of war, a hundred
thousand dead, and millions expelled from their homes, many of whom will probably never return
to them again? There is a bitter joke that has apparently been making the rounds around Bosnia
over the last few years – What is the difference between the Vance/Owen peace plan of
1992/1993 and the 1995 Dayton Accords? Thousands of corpses. Like many jokes, this one has
a certain truth to it, since the differences between the two peace plans were not that great.
Considering what was achieved through war was really no better than what could have been had
through Vance/Owen, or even more relevantly before the war with a compromise deal with the
Serbs in 1991 or 1992 – was not Izetbegović’s decision to pursue independence one huge
blunder?
One problem with this sort of thinking is that it involves thinking about things in
retrospect when all the facts are at hand; things were less clear in 1992 than 1995, although they
were more clear than some would like to admit. Bosnians could not have known for sure, for
instance, just how awful the Bosnian War would be, although as we have seen they had good
reason to guess that it would be painful, based on the precedent they had just seen set in Croatia,
and probably on the memories of what the costs of World War II had been as well. Remember
again Karadžić’s 1991 “Highway to Hell,” speech in the Bosnian parliament, when he threatened
the Bosnians with extinction if they declared independence; a Bosnian official admitted to
Kuperman that a “chill ran down my spine” when he heard Karadžić say that.233 As we have

Herzegovina). Eventually, one can surmise, the Muslims would have been a political force to be reckoned
with in the new Yugoslavia. Finally, Bosnia-Herzegovina probably would have been able, with the support
of Montenegro, to retain its status as a republic and many of the powers it had enjoyed in the old Yugoslav
federation.” Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and
International Intervention (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 71-72.
233
Ibid., 51.

110

seen, most of the SDA officials were aware that a Bosnian war would be bad, so they cannot be
allowed the excuse of not being able to know what would happen.
Another objection than can be made is that even if a deal had been struck and Izetbegović
had agreed to, say, one of the 1992/1992 cantonization plans, the Serbs would not have kept their
end of the bargain and war would have ensued anyway. In response to this Kuperman quotes the
Bosnian Serb leaders he interviewed, who insisted that under the various peace plans they would
have been under secure Serbian governments and would have had no need then to resort to ethnic
cleansing. What Biljana Plavšić, a Serbian member of the collective presidency before the war,
said was typical – she argued that she was very supportive of the original non-contiguous
cantonization proposal the Serbs brought forth in 1991, and it was only when independence was
declared that she and the Serbian leadership believed they had to resort to partition (and by
implication, ethnic cleansing) in order to provide for their security.234 Considering that Plavšić is
now sitting in a prison cell in Sweden, having been giving an eleven prison sentence after being
tried by the International War Crimes Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) at the Hague for
war crimes, some skepticism is in order about statements she and other Serbs have made in
retrospect. It is quite natural at this point that they will want to rehabilitate their images and do
anything they can to shift blame from their own actions and apply it to the Izetbegović
government.
In addition, it is easy to imagine scenarios existing for continued conflict and violence
even if something like the one of the cantonization plans had come into being. Suppose the
“generous” 1991 cantonization plan originally offered by the Bosnian Serbs had been agreed to
by the Izetbegović government. Even though this plan provided for Muslim-controlled cantons in
the areas in which they were the majority, there still would have been plenty of Muslim
minorities elsewhere who would have felt threatened being under Serbian or Croatian authority
(not to mention the Bosnian Serbs and Croats who would feel threatened being under Muslim
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authority). Remember also that this and other 1992 cantonization plans provided very little
authority to the central government, and that the Croatian and Serbian cantons would be free to
have relations with Croatia and Serbia/Yugoslavia – this would provide a huge incentive for
Croatia and Serbia to continue to meddle into the affairs of their countrymen’s’ cantons,
providing military supplies, encouragement for the Croatian and Serbian cantons to draw closer to
Croatia and Serbia/Yugoslavia respectively, and so forth. Since undoubtedly all sorts of tensions
would develop in the course of the implementation of these plans, it is also easy to imagine
population transfers occurring (sort of an ethnic-cleansing lite) on either a voluntary or
involuntary basis, something that would have most likely been a nightmare to oversee. Chances
are that it would have been the job of U.N. peace keepers to try to manage all of this, a case again
of their getting involved in an endeavor that was totally over their heads and which they were in
no way equipped to implement. Numerous potential sparks existed then, any of which could have
lit up into full-blown war.
Again though, honesty dictates the need to imagine a more benign scenario, although in
this case it is harder. One could argue that population transfers, for instance, however illiberal
and nasty they may be, are not necessarily the worst things in the world, and have been used in
unique situations in the past to make the best out of a bad situation in which the likely alternatives
are even worse. The scholar Michael Dark writes about such difficult situations, in which he
shows how such population exchanges as in 1919 between Greece and Bulgaria and in 1923
between Turkey and Greece were ways of cutting the Gordian Knot of the problem of minorities
in different states, and lives were saved in the process. Concerning the Bosnian case, he argues
that if the international community had actually taken a hands-off approach to the Bosnian
conflict and done nothing, then the Croats, Muslims, and Serbs themselves would have bowed to
the inevitable and allowed for the transfer of populations, since there would have been no way of
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minorities and majorities living together peacefully in Bosnia.235 It is an argument that I do not
find entirely persuasive, since he does not really provide, for instance, many specific examples to
show that Muslims in Bosnia condoned or promoted population transfers during the war, although
he does provide some.236 For Izetbegović to have advocated this to the Bosnians during a period
of “peace” would have been quite a job to say the least, although he could also have pointed out
that the alternative was a brutal war in which an even more violent population transfer would
inevitably occur. “Pick your poison,” Izetbegović would have been saying to the Bosnian people,
a statesmanship-like exhortation to be sure but perhaps also the death sentence of his political
career.
But enough with such counter-factual examples for a moment; they are in the end fairly
moot, since Izetbegović and the SDA decided, after all, to cast their lot with the international
community and hope they would bail the Bosnians out. Yet it is fair to this point to ask this
germane question: Was their trust and hope in the international community as sincere as they later
made them out to be? Or to put the question another way, it would have made sense for
Izetbegović to take a gamble and accept the risks of declaring independence rather than going
with the peace plans if he could be fairly certain the international community would back him up
- but can it be said that he was reasonably certain of this? To turn yet again to Kuperman, he
provides examples of how he believes the Americans in particular misled the Bosnian leaders into
thinking that the U.S. would protect Bosnia. To understand this, we must go back to February of
1992, when the European Community had proposed its own various cantonization plans as means
of avoiding war. American officials, and in particular Warren Zimmerman (who, as can be
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recalled, was quite sympathetic to the Bosnians) encouraged Izetbegović to reject the latest EC
cantonization plan since it was seen as unjust by the Americans and the Bosnians. Yet by doing
this and then still declaring Bosnian independence in just a few weeks without providing for a
cantonization plan that would make the Bosnian Serbs and Croats feel more secure, Izetbegović
knew that the Americans were suggesting that the Bosnians do something rather risky.
According to Kuperman, precisely because the Americans were asking the Bosnians to do
something risky, Izetbegović and his government could logically gather from this that the
Americans were also suggesting – if not exactly saying – that the U.S. would be there for them in
the likely case of war. And although the U.S. government certainly did not see things this way,
for their part they were hoping that by being seen as strongly supporting Bosnia’s international
recognition as a state, the Serbs would not call the Americans’ bluff and would leave Bosnia
alone.237 It all ended up being a tragic miscalculation on the part both of the Bosnians and
Americans.
But as far as the Bosnians were concerned, was it more than just a tragic miscalculation?
For how could they really have believed that the Americans would provide any military
assistance, or enough anyway (i.e. more than just air strikes) to have really stopped a Serbian
juggernaut? It was mentioned already in chapter three that Sijladžić was specifically informed by
a major National Security official that the U.S. could not provide any military assistance,
although to be fair this was a few weeks after American officials had given the Bosnians
encouragement in February 1992 to reject the EC cantonization plan. Still, there were absolutely
no definitive assurances at all and at any time before the war by the Americans or anybody else
that the Bosnians could expect any help if the Serbs attacked them. For somebody like
Izetbegović to have thought along the lines of Well, the Americans suggested I reject the
cantonization plan and risk the danger of war, and although they did not actually promise
military aid they certainly would not let us do something so dangerous and then not support us,
237
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would they? suggests not merely naiveté on his part but a serious dereliction of duty as leader of
his country.238 Or consider what Zulfikarpašić claims Izetbegović said to him in the summer of
1991, that “the United States and United Kingdom will not allow a single massacre [of a
Bosnian],” a statement that is so amazing if true that it is hard to believe Izetbegović could really
have believed it when he said it. More likely is that he was just saying this for show, and it is
possible that he concurred with what Zulfikarpašić and another prominent political figure
Muhamed Filipović apparently told him in response, “They will never send troops. They will
send medicine and blankets and will count the dead.”239
Why did Izetbegović not agree to any of the peace plans then, since that appears to have
been his original inclination anyway in 1991 and 1992? Part of the answer can perhaps be found
in his indecisiveness, with Izetbegović thinking at times the international community would help,
and other times thinking they would not. Perhaps another part lies in a simple lack of backbone,
with his not being willing to stand up to other members of the SDA. Yet I suspect (although it
cannot be proven) that the major reason is that it was just easier for Izetbegović and others to
hope, or want to believe, that the international community would help them, rather than just
facing the facts and acknowledging that the Europeans and Americans would not help them and
they would have to face the vastly superior Serbs alone. If Izetbegović were to have faced this
fact though, then he and other members of the SDA would also have had to face the possibility
that it might have made more sense to deal, since again being either a part of a rump Yugoslavia
or in a partitioned Bosnia might have not been the best thing in the world and might not have
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even prevented war, but there was good reason to think that the alternative to these options was
even worse.
Which brings us back in a rather convoluted way to Berić’s original point, that the war
that actually occurred was inevitable because Bosnians never could have submitted to having
been a part of “Serboslavia,” or by implication to a partitioned (or partition-lite) Bosnia. After
the preceding analysis though, it could be argued that Berić is wrong about this, that because it
should have been seen as self-evident to everyone that some things could indeed be worse than
remaining in a rump Yugoslavia, it would have been possible for Izetbegović then to have
persuaded the Bosnian public of the folly of declaring independence. But this brings us also to
another point made in chapter three, which is the ability of Izetbegović to have made such an
argument would have been incredibly difficult. No people like to be told that they really have no
good alternatives, that the game is up, that they have been presented with a fait accompli (to use
just a few political clichés), but in a more diplomatic and sugar-coated manner that is basically
the news Izetbegović would have had to present to the Bosnian people. Would they have
accepted it? This brings us again to the terra incognita of hypotheticals so some skepticism is
again in order, but if the history of other nations is any guide then there is good reason to believe
the Bosnians would not.
Consider the thesis Donald Kagan presents in his fine work On the Origins of War and
the Preservation of Peace, where he alludes to the ideas of Thucydides and argues that peoples go
to war for three reasons (or out of three motives) – fear, honor, and interest. Kagan goes on to
point out that although it makes sense to most people that a nation would go to war out of interest
and fear, the fact that nations go to war simply because they believe it is honorable is much
harder to comprehend, since there seems to be something retrograde and ancient about that.
However, it does not make it any less true – as Kagan puts it, “If… we understand its [honor’s]
significance as deference, esteem, just due, regard, respect, or prestige we will find it an
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important motive of nations in the modern world as well.”240 Many of these preceding notions
just listed could be used to explain why Bosnians – like the Slovenes and Croats before them –
would have found it dishonorable to have remained a part of a rump Yugoslavia or consented to
the partition of their nation. After all that Milošević had already done in the various Yugoslav
republics for example, how could Bosnians have had regard for themselves – to pick just one of
Kagan’s words – if they then just submitted to this leader’s sovereignty? As one of my Bosnian
subjects, Amir Karadžić, said to me, “We recognized that if we were to be part of Serbia we
would almost be slaves, we would not be able to keep our nationality, so we had no choice [but to
become independent].”241 Strong words, these. One could object that Karadžić is being rather
hyperbolic here, but that is exactly the point, for just being under Milošević’s rule would have
been dishonorable for him. In the end then, Izetbegović probably could not have accepted any of
these peace plans even though he was personally inclined to accept them, simply because too
many of the Bosnian people and influential figures within his party would not have accepted them
along with him.
Berić goes on to discuss Izetbegović’s conduct during the war and says something we
already know, which is that war as well as “the hypocritical attitude of the West to the genocide
against the Bosniak people” pushed Izetbegović into a more militant direction.242 A good
question to ask then is if Izetbegović at this point was already inclined to create a more Islamic
state anyway, why did he not cut his losses and just agree to what would have been a Muslim
mini-state between Croatian and Serbian states? The cynical, although perhaps also realistic,
answer is that he and the SDA simply wanted to get back more territory from the Croats and
Serbs that they could then incorporate into their Islamic-oriented part of Bosnia. The more
positive answer is that though his more Islamic attitude predominated, he perhaps did still have
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some feelings after all for the multi-ethnicity of Bosnia. Chances are that there is truth to both of
these responses.243 Since it was his Muslim nationalism that many Bosnian Serbs and Croats saw
though, it made it more difficult for the Bosnian army to retake territory because Bosnian
Christians wanted no part of a SDA government dominating over them.244
When the war finally ended and Izetbegović came back to Bosnia after Dayton in 1995,
Berić notes that there was no celebration at all in the streets of Sarajevo.245 Probably some of this
was just a matter of war fatigue, but much of it was also undoubtedly due to the fact that the
Sarajevans were thinking something along the lines of “We put up with three and a half years of
war for this!” It is hardly surprising that they would have thought this – to allude to the joke
mentioned earlier, there really was not much more that was achieved through Dayton that would
not have also been had through Vance/Owen. Indeed, in one way at least Dayton was worse,
since it allowed for the Republic Srpska to maintain relations with Yugoslavia/Serbia, something
that was not allowed under Vance/Owen. And like the European Community proposals before
the war, it allowed for what was a de facto partition of Bosnia, with the country in many ways
being two nations with separate government institutions (both the Federation and Republic Srpska
were allowed to have armies, for instance) held together by a weak central government in
Sarajevo.246 True, there were now at least 60,000 European and American troops to hold the
country together, but their stay there would be only temporary. And now, fourteen years after
Dayton was concluded, there remain only 2,000 European troops, with signs of fissures appearing
at the seams of the Bosnian fabric and with talk of the Republic Srpska seceding from Bosnia and
joining up with Serbia.
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From this analysis then, it would seem that Izetbegović’s tenure as president of Bosnia
was in many ways was a failure, and that he cannot be considered to have been a leader despite
himself. Perhaps the only way his image might take on a more positive tone in the future is if
reconciliation begins to occur between the ethnic groups in Bosnia and Izetbegović’s
unwillingness to allow for the break-up of Bosnia or her becoming a part of Yugoslavia will have
been vindicated, something that shows no real possibilities of happening as of yet. If it does
someday though, and Bosnia can truly be said to be a nation and not just a motley collection of
three ethnic groups, perhaps then will Izetbegovic’s statesmanship have brought something of
real value to the Bosnian people..
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